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Summary findings
Traditionally, transport regulation has been viewed as an  Restructuring has brought new problems, too. Where
exercise in second-best optimization, acknowledging the  licenses have been used, for example, several
existence of huge information problems. Then the rail  concessionaires have been unable to meet the objectives
industry was deeply restructured worldwide to halt  spelled out in the concession contract. Contracts should
erosion of the sector's share of transportation  markets.  be flexible enough to take account of novel situations
Restructuring took different forms in different  that may affect company performance. And yet, for the
countries, ranging from simple reorganization measures  system to be credible, there cannot be systematic,
to extreme restructuring-with  the private sector  unjustified deviations from the franchise objectives.
increasingly participating in the sector and with the  Regulation of the sector should be simple and flexible,
provision of infrastructure separated from the provision  with license contracts designed to include the private
of services.  sector and with industry organization adapted to local
Campos and Cantos argue that regulation of the rail  circumstances. Regulation should be governed by
industry cannot remain unaffected by these changes.  principles that foster competition and market
New regulatory scenarios and issues have emerged. For  mechanisms, wherever possible. At the same time, it
example, contracts have to be defined for private  should provide a stable legal and institutional framework
participation and quality surveillance instruments must  for economic activity.
be defined. Traditional  price controls have to be adapted  Otherwise, regulators should refrain from intervening
to, and mechanisms designed to manage and plan  in the market-unless  the goal of economic efficiency
infrastructure  investments in, the new environment.  (subject to the socially demanded level of equity) is in
jeopardy.
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The railway industry poses a number of specific problems for transport economists and
regulators that are only partially shared with other transport modes. These elements are the
multi-product nature of the activity, the particular cost structure of railroad companies, the
role played by infrastructures and networks, the existence of indivisibilities in inputs and
outputs,  the organization  of the rail  transport as  a public  service,  and the  existence of
externalities in the transport system as a whole  (Button, 1993). These characteristics not
only  define a  descriptive framework for  this  sector that  will  be  continually referred to
throughout this paper, but also jointly determine the main factors that should be considered
when studying in detail the appropriate economic regulation for the rail industry.
1.1. - The multi-product nature of the activity.
Rail  companies are,  in  most  cases,  multi-product  firms  that  provide  different  types  of
freight and passenger  transport  services. In the  case of  freight, together  with  the usual
transport of bulk freight, rail operators also supply complete cargo wagons or trains, parcel
and  postal  services, as  well  as  other  services  of  intermodal  transport.  In  the  case of
passenger transport, long-distance traffic usually coexists with local services (suburban and
commuter trains), regional services, and even with high-speed trains on certain corridors or
routes. '
The implications  of the multi-product nature  of the  activity can be examined  at
different levels. At the accounting level, for example, it is often difficult to allocate total
operating costs among services. For instance, many of the costs of running a long-distance
train (including not only infrastructure costs but also variable costs) are shared by different
types of traffic and these joint  costs coexist with other costs not affected by changes in
output. 2 Some  cost  elements may  be  attributable  to  a  particular  traffic  (for  example,
passengers),  but  most  of  them  (wagons,  energy,  staff,...)  may  not.  Thus,  cost
interdependence requires simultaneous decisions on prices and services, which, in practice,
makes any regulatory task much harder.
At the cost level,  another important aspect to  be considered in the multi-product
setup  of the rail industry  is the  sub-additivity of  the cost  function faced by  a railroad.
According to Baumol (1977), a cost function is sub-additive when the provision of services
by a single firm is more efficient (in terms of a lower unit cost) than the same production
carried out by two or more companies. This idea conveys two relevant implications for the
rail industry. First, is it more efficient for a single firm, rather than two separate firms, to
supply both infrastructure and transport services? Second, if the infrastructure and services
are  separated,  is  the  supply  of  such  services  more  efficient  within  the  context  of  a
monopoly, or should two or more firms participate.  This analysis is connected with  the
advantages and disadvantages of the separation of infrastructure from services and will be
discussed below in depth after first describing in more detail the cost structure of a typical
i  Commuter and suburban passenger traffic will be analyzed in other working-papers on this series.
2For  instance, the common costs of signal maintenance along a line section usually do not increase if the
proportions of traffic of the different services change.
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1.2.  - The cost structure  of railways  companies.
Railways costs are often classified into four broad cost categories: (i) train working costs,
which include the costs of the provision of transport services (fuel, crew, maintenance and
depreciation  of  rolling  stock);  (ii) track  and  signaling  costs  (including  the  operation,
maintenance and depreciation costs of the infrastructure); (iii) terminal and station costs;
and finally (iv), administration costs (Waters, 1985). The first two cost categories, typically,
are prevalent in most companies and change according to several factors. 3
Among train working costs, the cost of rolling stock items depend on both their
amount and the distance they run. Fuel costs depend on car-kilometers run for each type of
vehicle, while train crew costs vary according to train-kilometers run. Track and signaling
costs  usually rely  on the  length  of  the  route  (since they  all  usually  rely on  a  single,
standard-quality track). The amount of track and signaling required, however, changes with
the number of trains for which paths are required, although this relationship is not constant.
Terminal and station costs depend on the traffic volume, but they vary considerably with
the type of traffic.4 Finally, administration costs fluctuate depending on the overall size of
the firm, although the precise nature of this dependence is difficult to determine in general.
Therefore,  as  mentioned  above,  allocating  the  different  costs  of  a  typical  rail
operator to the multiple outputs or inputs it produces is a complex task. It often involves a
degree of arbitrariness that requires, from  a regulatory  point of view,  a clear distinction
between costs that are avoidable and those that are not. The avoidable costs are uniquely
associated  with  a  particular  output:  were  this  output  not  produced,  no  cost  would  be
incurred.  This  guiding  principle  relates  to  the  cost  recovery  for  particular  outputs.
Avoidable costs may therefore be considered as a floor to regulated prices (if any), since
charging less than the avoidable cost would be equivalent to operating at an economic loss.
1.3. - The particular role of rail infrastructure.
Since the birth of the rail industry in the last century, mainstream economists have always
considered that the larger the size of a railway company, the greater was its efficiency. The
existence  of  substantial  fixed  costs  (particularly,  those  associated  with  infrastructures)
traditionally led economists to assume the presence of important economies of scale in this
industry,  and  thus  the  provision  of rail  transport  services  was typically  regarded  as  a
textbook example of a natural monopoly.
However, this notion has been heavily challenged in recent decades and a number of
new ideas have been brought to the economic analysis of this industry. The upheaval and
development  of  the theory  of  contestable markets  (Baumol,  Panzar  and  Willig,  1982)
3 Nash (1982) finds that train working  costs in European  firms (with the notable exception  of high speed
passenger  traffic)  accounted  for 44%-45%,  whereas  track and signaling  was  just  230/o-26%  of total  costs.
4For  instance,  bulk freight handling  requires more terminal  expenses  than parcel services. Similarly,  long
distance  passengers  require  more  services  (ticketage,  reservations,  luggage,...)  than short  distance  users.
-5-contributed  to clarifying  the proper definition  of the natural monopoly  concept, in terms of
the cost function being sub-additive.  This concept implies that whereas duplicating rail
infrastructure  is generally  inefficient  (therefore categorizing  the rail network as subject to
natural monopoly  conditions),  the cost relating to the operation of rail transport services
and rolling stock once the network  has been deployed  can be efficiently  provided  by more
than one company,  which can be viewed  as actual or potential  competitors.
Therefore, from  the  regulatory point  of  view,  it  has  been  concluded that
infrastructure  and services can be dealt with in different ways: the former, as a natural
monopoly, 5 but also as a potential provider of adequate access to any willing-to-serve
operator; the  latter, however, can  be treated, in  principle, as  any other competitive
economic  activity that could be provided by multiple competing  operators  or by a single
firm under  some  sort of concession  or license arrangement.
1.4.  - The existence  of asset indivisibilities.
Even though this potential  vertical separation  can alleviate some of the natural monopoly
problems, the rail industry remains a  very capital-intensive  sector with several other
indivisibilities  within its productive  process. Specifically,  the capital units (rolling stock,
track and stations) can be expanded only in discrete or indivisible increments, whereas
demand  may fluctuate  in much smaller units. Consequently,  increases  (decreases)  in supply
could clearly  exceed the increases  (decreases)  on the demand side, thus resulting  in excess
capacity.  These problems  appear  in connection  to both rolling stock and rail infrastructure.
Given that the unit of supply is usually a train or wagon of a given capacity,  increases  in
capacity  can only be achieved  by the supply  of additional  units.
This lumpiness of rail transport facilities has several important implications for
investment  and pricing. For example,  the transportation  costs of an additional  unit of traffic
(freight or passengers) may be insignificant when there is  idle capacity, but may be
substantial  when the capital  is at the limit of its full use.
Firms can also be forced to employ fixed assets with differing economic lives,
whose  reliability  spans over a large time horizon and affects  heterogeneously  the cost items
described  above,  modifying  investment  decisions,  and requiring  a complete  accounting  and
management information system. Therefore, dynamic price  and output considerations
become  crucial  in order  to recover  the real costs associated  with each period of activity.
Similarly,  a final implication  of the presence of indivisibilities  in the capital assets
used in the rail industry is that innovation and infrastructure  improvement  projects are
usually deferred and only carried out in small discrete amounts. Railway firms seldom
change  the entire  definition  of their existing  network  even though in most countries  it might
correspond  to an inherited  burden from past decades when the structure  of traffic  was quite
likely different from what it is today. Instead, they opt for partial renovations  that often
introduce technical asymmetries  between tracks within a country or region, accentuating
their indivisibilities  and inflexibilities  (Boyer,  1997).
5 At least,  when  the infrastructure  has  not been built yet, although  not necessarily  after that moment.
- 6 -1.5. - The organization of railways transport as a public service.
Although not derived from any of its technical characteristics, but rather from historical and
organizational reasons, the conception of rail transportation as a public or social service,
irrespective of its profitability, is another of the defining elements that have determined the
worldwide  industry  organization and  performance  during  this  century.  The low  rolling
resistance of steel wheels on steel rails made railroad transportation extremely fuel efficient
and relatively cheap. This allowed railroads to rapidly grow as the first mass transportation
system, particularly for passengers, beginning in the years of the industrial revolution.
For military and industrial reasons, some form of public control was envisaged in
most countries, and many imposed their control by legal mandate. Public control over the
rail  industry  occurred  both  with  or  without  accompanying  subsidies,  public  service
obligations to rail transport providers in the form of compulsory (often unprofitable) routes,
organized  timetables  or  particular  services to  strategic products  or  areas. The ultimate
reason behind this control, which remains the same today, is that this industry is regarded
as an integrative mechanism able to overcome geographical barriers in certain areas, aid in
the economic development of undeveloped zones,  and even as a guarantee of minimum
transport services for a particular segment of the population.
1.6. - The existence of externalities in the overall transport system.
The--policy goal of public  service  obligation  is  often supported  with  the  idea that  rail
transportation contributes  less to  the rise  of negative  externalities than other  modes of
transport, especially road transport. There is abundant empirical evidence showing that the
external costs derived from congestion, accidents or environmental impact (noise, visual
impact, pollution, etc.) could be reduced if a substantial part of the road traffic market were
transferred to the railway sector (Button, 1993).6
This  intermodal externality arises  from the fact that  road transport does not fully
internalize all the social costs that it generates and economists often recommend the use of
congestion and/or pollution rates, for example, to  take this into account. However, when
these mechanisms  are not feasible  or politically viable,  it might be  preferable to  lower
railway fares in order to obtain an overall improved intermodal balance. These principles
should also be considered when defining the appropriate regulation for the rail industry.
In summary, all the above mentioned characteristics - sketched and summarized in
Box 1.1 - suggest that an analysis of the regulation of railway transport should be carried
out  within  a  general  context,  taking  into  account  the technological  and  organizational
features of the industry. This study will start with a detailed evaluation of the performance
of the industry in recent years.
6However,  for  this to be true in all cases,  high levels  of demand  are also  required.
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2. - POLICY AND  REGULATION IN THE  RAIL INDUSTRY.
The overall evolution of rail transportation in recent years as compared to other transport
modes is summarized in Box 2.1 for OECD countries. There was a substantial fall of the
market  share in both  freight and passenger  markets  during the  1970s and  1980s, which
apparently stabilized during the 1990s. The decline is particularly relevant because it took
place in a period when the total volume carried in both markets experienced a growth of
about 50%. Thus, the rail industry appears not to have been able to take advantage of the
growing demand for transport in the last 25 years.
This substantial reduction in market share, which is not only particular to OECD
countries but also a common trend around the world, can be attributed to both exogenous
and endogenous causes. The first category includes the rapid development of alternative
modes of transport, especially by road. In the case of passengers, economic growth has
fostered the development of the automobile market, which has led to an enormous growth
in the indices of motorization. In freight transport, an expanding and competitive trucking
sector gained a growing percentage of road transport in many countries. For example, in
1970 in Europe, there were 150 cars per 1000 inhabitants; the figure is now 424. Similarly,
the number of heavy vehicles and trucks increased from 7 to  17 million in the 1970-1994
period.
The endogenous  causes of the decline can be summarized in the inability of the
sector to adapt itself to the changing conditions of its economic environment. Regulation
remained obsolete and the rail industry was slow to react. The policies adopted during the
-8  -1980s, as described  below,  did  not  halt  the  steady loss  of  market  share,' the  growing
financial deficits, and in some countries, the impossibility of raising the low productivity
indices of the industry. Thus, more radical restructuring processes were put into practice.
Box 2.1. Market shares of different transport modes (1970-1994).
Rafi(%)  31.3240~  23.02n  1.
|4  i%  5.2  65.  -69o3-  76.2 
Source:  CEMT.  Evolution  des Transports.  OECD  Countries.  (1970-1994).
2.1. - Consequences of the traditional policies on the rail industry.
During the past fifty years, the most common structure of the rail sector in many countries
was the existence of a single State-owned firm, entrusted with the unified management of
both the infrastructure and the rail services. Despite some differences  in their degree of
commercial autonomy, the traditional  methods of  regulation and  control of this  sort of
company have been relatively homogeneous. In general, it was assumed that the monopoly
power of the national company required price and service regulation to protect the general
interest.  In addition, there  was an obligation on the part of the companies to  meet  any
demand  at  those  prices.  The closure  of  existing  lines or  the  opening  of new  services
required government approval. Thus, competition was rare and often discouraged, and the
preservation  of  the  national  character  of  the  industry  was  considered  the  key  factor
governing the overall regulation.
Due to this protective environment, most national rail companies incurred growing
trading deficits during the  1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, social obligations to their  staff
made  it  nearly  impossible  to  reach  any  agreement  on  redundancies  or  even  wage
adjustments.  In some  countries, the companies  were  forced to  finance  their  deficits by
borrowing, so that their accounts came to lose all resemblance to reality. Thus, the main
problems associated with the traditional policies on railways were: (i) increasing losses on
the companies' trading account, which  were usually financed via public  subsidies; (ii) a
high degree of inefficiency in management; and (iii) a business activity oriented exclusively
toward production targets, rather than commercial and market targets. 7 These distortions
did  not  come from  an  artificial  reduction  in  the  range of  services provided,  nor  from
excessively high fares, but, more commonly, from an unjustified increase in the supply of
7 On this point, Oum and Yu (1994) and Gathon and Pestieau (1995) have empirically showed  that the
companies  that achieve  greatest efficiency  were those that had been run with a higher level of autonomy  and
independence  from State intervention.
9-services (and hence, of costs). Such behavior implies larger public subsidies. The lack, in
many cases, of commercially oriented tariffs and investment policies explained many of the
difficulties  faced by  the  companies.  All  these  considerations,  together  with  the  burden
imposed by the technical characteristics of the sector described in Section 1, placed most
railways  in  a  very  weak  position  in  competition  against  alternative  transport  modes.
However,  this  fierce  intermodal  competition  was  not,  by  itself,  able  to  improve  the
competitiveness  of the railway  system. As  a result,  it was necessary to  adopt measures
affecting the  internal behavior  and  structure  of the  sector itself.  Therefore,  the  overall
decline of the sector sparked a widespread restructuring movement around the world.
2.2. - Recent rail deregulation and privatization experiences.
The worldwide  restructuring process  of the rail industry  began with timid  reforms.  For
example,  many  countries  began  by  replacing  their  national railways  with  autonomous
commercial bodies  possessing  independent  and  realistic  balance-sheets,  in  which  only
public  service  obligations  could  be  explicitly  subsidized  by  the  government.  Other
countries opted for substituting their old geographically based management with a mnulti-
divisional structure, defined by the companies'  different lines of business or services. Box
2.2  summarizes these characteristics for  several countries  allowing us to  compare their
similarities and differences.
At first glance, one of the common features is that some countries have carried out a
relatively  long  process  of  restructuring,  whereas  others  have  preferred  quick
implementations  over  a  shorter  period.  For  example,  the  privatization  of  the  national
railways in New Zealand and Japan was phased  over several years, while Argentin,a and
United Kingdom did the main parts in less than two years. Another common characteristic
is that  all restructuring processes  were  undertaken  to  make the companies  attractive to
private investors. Total privatization has been preferred to tendering  or concessioning in
many cases. This has involved revision of laws and other regulations  affecting railways,
reducing staff, dealing with pension issues, and deciding how much property should be sold
and how much should be retained by the State. In addition, several arrangements for paying
for unprofitable (but socially needed) train  services were put into place, together with  a
precise definition of the concession contracts and their main terms. With regard to results,
in general, most of the restructuring experiences detailed below seem to have been positive.
The objectives of  stopping the industry's  drain on the  State's resources,  along with the
stabilization  of  market  share  for  both  passengers  and  freight,  were  achieved  in  most
countries.  Likewise,  the  companies  succeeded  in  raising  their  levels  of  productivity.
Nevertheless, two important caveats for future regulation must be taken into account. First,
the process of privatization chosen in each country depends on the basic objectives sought:
to maintain an industry with one operator or a small number, or to facilitate a process of
competition on the track. Second, legacies from the traditional mechanisms of regulation
should  be  avoided.  In  particular,  high  debt  levels  and  excess  staff  numbers  are  two
problems that wherever they are found must be dealt with before starting any privatization
policy.
-10-Box 2.2.a. Deregulation  and privatization  experiences  in Railways.
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One of the most clearly defined patterns that emerges from deregulation and restructuring
measures is found in the extent to which they carry out two critical dimensions summarized
in  Box  2.3:  the  degree  of  separation  between  infrastructure  and  services,  and  the
involvement of private management in the sector (Kopicki and Thompson, 1995).
2.3.1. - Vertical separation.
With respect to the first dimension, there are three main different options for the vertical
organization of the railway industry: (i) vertical integration, (ii) competitive access, and (iii)
vertical separation. The first structure corresponds to the traditional and historical model of
railway organization described above, where a single (usually public) entity controls all the
infrastructure facilities as well as the operating and administrative functions.
Competitive  access  is  characterized  by  the  existence  of  an  integrated  operator
(usually public), which is required to make its rail facilities (tracks, stations, etc...) available
to other operators on a fair and equal basis through the trading of, for example, circulation
rights.  This method keeps the advantages of integration (in termns  of economies of scope,
coordinated planning and reduction in transaction costs) but, as will be discussed in Section
5,  if  the  integrated  company  has  incentives  to  leave  out  other  operators,  the  overall
effectiveness of the system may be doubtful.
Alternatively,  in  the  complete  vertical  separation  scenario,  the  ownership  of
facilities is fully separated from other rail functions (train operations, marketing, etc.) and
can  also  be  privatized.  This  form  of  restructuring  is  very  attractive  because  rail
infrastructure, which remains characterized by natural monopoly conditions, is separated
from  rail  operations,  where  potential  competition  among  different  operators  may  be
implemented.  In  general,  the  main  advantage  of  this  vertical  unbundling  is  that  rail
transport  is  placed  in  a  similar  situation  as  road  transport,  especially  in  regard  to
infrastructure planning and the tariff system. Hence, governments could study investment
proposals on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, while pricing policies could be based on
the criterion of social cost. An important problem here lies in the difficulty of defining the
social cost of railway infrastructure use. The determination of the marginal or incremental
costs of the use and wear and tear of one additional train is not, in principle, any more
difficult than the equivalent calculation for road transport. The problem, however, is greatly
complicated for the railway when this cost is evaluated in a congested environment. In pure
economic terms this cost is the opportunity cost of the stretch of track in question, but in
practice,  the  quantification of  this  opportunity  cost  is  difficult,  especially  if there  is  a
mixture of social and commercial services.
In addition, separation of infrastructure from services greatly facilitates the entry of
more than one operator on a single route. In profitable services or routes this system would
permit  notable  improvements  in  the  efficiency  of  the  industry  by  allowing  direct
competition among operators, and thus eliminating standard monopolistic practices in the
sector.  In  non-profitable  services,  infrastructure  separation  can  be  accompanied  by
- 13 -tendering, thus  stimulating increased  efficiency through  competition  for the market,  the
introduction of innovations, and a clear improvement in marketing.
However,  the  vertical  unbundling  of  the  rail  industry  also  implies  several
disadvantages that must be evaluated. The main problem is the potential loss of economies
of scope derived from the joint operation of tracks and services. It is often pointed out that
the relationship between the services supplied and the rolling stock used, as well as the
quality, quantity  and technical  characteristics of the infrastructure, is so close that both
aspects need to be planned together. Thus, the assignment of different services to several
operators may imply  a  lower  utilization  of the  staff  and  physical  assets  of the  sector.
Another negative argument is based on the risk that the new system may be less attractive
8  w to the user than an integrated system.  The separated system also facilitates the growth of
transaction costs and of a complex  institutional framework. This is the argument that, in
order  to  bring  about  a  degree  of  competition  in  rail  transport,  the  government  must
postulate such a complex institutional arrangement that each organization will be involved
in  negotiating  a  huge  number  of  contracts,  with  the  result  that  transaction  costs  may
become prohibitive.
Finally, one last disadvantage of the process of vertical separation of infrastnrcture
and services is the reduction of investment incentives by the company or body managing it.
An infrastructure owner considering  an investment on a facility with  only one potential
buyer will anticipate bargaining away  some of the benefit  from the new service once it
comes  on  line.  This  problem  becomes  less  relevant the  higher  the  competition  in  the
market,  since  competition  weakens  the  bargaining  position  of  individual  operators  in
negotiating with the infrastructure owner.
2.3.2. - Private participation.
With  respect  to  the  dimension  of  private  participation  in  the  industry,  Galenson  and
Thompson (1993) provide a list (ordered in terns  of increasing private participation) of the
different  situations that can be  found in the  world rail industry.  The first situation  is  a
government department, where  the railroad  is fully controlled by the government or the
relevant  Transport  Ministry,  so  its  degree  of  independence  is  zero.  Ownership  and
operations are fully public and financed by budgetary transfers.
The second examnple  is a public enterprise, where the railway is characterizecl  by a
higher managerial autonomy, although  still subject to government approval for many of
their  decisions. Normally,  these  railways  sign  more  or  less  formal  contracts  with  the
government, where the objectives and responsibilities of each entity are clearly specified. In
addition, it is usual that some restrictions  on the levels of public subsidies are gradually
introduced. Similarly, the case of a reformed public  enterprise corresponds to a situation
where  the  railway  is  corporatized  (into  a  shareholding  company),  commercialized
(financially  and managerially autonomous), and made subject to  the country's  comipany
law. However, the government, as the main owner, decides the pricing policies anid the
s For example,  because  of the failure  to achieve  even  headways,  or the lack of interchangeable  ticketingy  or the
lack of an integrated  information  system).
- 14 -investment  levels,  while  guaranteeing,  by  the  necessary  subsidies,  the  supply  of  non-
economical social services.
There are other situations that include some mixed forms of cooperation between
private and public capital. For example, in some countries rail services are provided in a
regime  of service  contract  with  the  private  sector, where,  maintaining  full  ownership,
governments or public enterprises can contract any activity to be performed by a private
sector entity. Examples of these activities are food catering, medical services, systems of
ticket sales, maintenance of physical assets, etc. Related to these there are management
contracts with the private  sector, where the contractor assumes the responsibility  for the
operations and maintenance of certain activities. A variation on these is given by leasing to
the private sector. In this case, the contractor pays a fee for the use of the fixed assets. The
contractor has more autonomy than in management contracts, controlling aspects such as
the working capital and the staff. For this  reason, the lease contractor assumes more risk
than a management contractor. The owner maintains responsibility for investment and debt
service. In  many  countries wagons  and  locomotives  are  sold  or leased  to  non-railway
entities, as in the transportation of very specialized goods.
Box 2.3.  Alternative organizational structures in railways.
I~  ~~ovrun  Inia  Chna_oe
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Source: Elaborated from Galenson and Thompson (1993).
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certain fixed investments and maintains the use of the assets for a longer contract period. At
present, it is the most used way of restructuring the rail industry, and it will be extensively
discussed in the remaining sections of this paper.9 Finally, there are joint  ventures, which
entail  the  largest  degree  of  private  participation,  where  private  partners  contribute
development capital, planning  and  management  expertise  to  develop  land or other  real
estate owned by a railway. There is also full private  ownership, where certain services or
whole companies are operated by private firms. Box 2.3 summarizes the overall structure of
the railway industry around the world in these two dimensions.
2.4. - New regulatory scenarios in the rail industry.
Present  circumstances,  as  well  as  the  importance  of  the  vertical  separation/private
participation dimensions, creates a new framework for increasing the liberalization of the
rail  sector. This  significantly  introduces new  roles  and  functions  for the regulator  and
modifies the number of possible regulatory structures. The choice of each particular method
for railway restructuring will actually depend on a number of particular objectives or goals
that  the  regulator  must  clearly  balance  and  weight  accordingly  within  the  economic
environment in which its activity takes place.
Box 2.4. Different rail regulatory scenarios and their objectives.
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proiingte  services  at  th  oe  t  posbecs,xn  hrfr  geeaigaxfiin  ieo In particular,  one  of the  first  elements to  consider  is the  existence of financial
constraints, in terms of the maximization of the proceedings obtained by the State after the
restructuring process and the subsequent minimization of the State's  financial burden. A
second  element  to  consider  is  the  pursuit  of  internal  (or  cost)  effiiciency in  termns  of
providing services at the lowest possible cost, and therefore generating an efficient use of
9 In fact,  the exact  denomination  of the privatization  agreement,  either  concession,  license or  franchise,  for
example, varies among countries and depends on the final property of the assets.
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prices equal to the marginal social cost, which, from -anr  inter-modal viewpoint, facilitates
the  best  distribution  of  traffics.  The  objective  of  dynamic  efficiency  requires  the
minimization  of  costs  in  the  long term  by  means  of  active  and  technology-improving
investment policies. There can also be equity  objectives, such as facilitating transport for
any citizen independent of his level of income. Finally, the government can also consider
the  goal  of  optimal  allocation  of  capacity,  which  favors  the  management  of  railway
capacity  as  well  as  the  co-ordination  with  other  modes  of  transport  and  the  overall
minimization ofrisks  in terms of maintenance of the service across time, risk of default, etc.
The combination  of these  objectives creates  at  least eight  different  possible  regulatory
scenarios grouped in decreasing order of private participation (see Box 2.4.). Some other
possible  scenarios have  been  eliminated  (such  as  those  relating  to  the  mixed  forms
described above).'0
The  objectives  enumerated  in  this  box  could be  given  a  different  weight.  For
example, financial and cost efficiency objectives have recently been valued above all other
types, which explains the boom in privatization measures, both by a system of concessions
and by direct sale to the private sector. In addition, there is an evident tradeoff between the
financial and efficiency objectives and those of a social nature as the degree of privatization
of the scenario increases. Thus, the scenarios characterized by the  existence of a public
company  clearly  serve  social  objectives  (equity,  reduction  of  risks  on  the  service,
intermodal co-ordination, etc). This type of company, however, was shown to be inefficient
and likely to produce huge commercial deficits. As we have already indicated, these were;
the main reasons for the restructuring of the sector.
The deregulation measures that define Scenarios 4 and 5 (concession system) have
the  advantages  of  favoring the  efficiency  and  solvency  of  the  companies,  as  well  as
reducing the State's financial burden (although possibly these effects are not as great as in
direct privatization). In addition, concession contracts allow the cushioning of some of the
negative effects that may arise from the actions of the private company. Thus, it is habitual
to establish maximum prices and minimum service quality levels, so that impact on equity,
can be  minimized. Likewise many routes  can continue  to  be  served which, though  not
profitable, are beneficial from  a social viewpoint. The concession of these routes to the
operators who request a  lower level of public subsidy meets both  efficiency and  equity
objectives.
In  regard  to  dynamic  efficiency,  the  first  results  of  the  levels  of  investment
implemented by the restructured companies or bodies are ambiguous. Thus, in Argentina
the investment levels of some operators have been below those foreseen in their concession
contracts,  though  at  the  aggregate  level,  investment  levels  seem  to  have  improved.
Something similar has occurred with some passenger franchises in the United Kingdom. At
any rate, the effective investment levels  should be, compared  with those  existing in the
10  This is because  many  of these forms  of private  participation  are related  to very specific  services  (in the case
of service  or management  contracts)  and  on occasions  some of the forms  of contracting  (e.g. leasing)  are very
similar  to those established  in a concession  or franchising  system.
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indeed led to a substantial recovery in investment levels in both infrastructure and rolling
stock, with an evident improvement in service quality. In other countries, such as Japan,
privatization does not seem to have slowed the technological development of the railway
industry (Fujimori, 1997).
Operational risks, apart from other types of considerations, are minimized when a
public enterprise  is entrusted with  their management.  With  a private  company, there  is
obviously  greater  risk  of  closure  of  certain  services,  or  of  larger  instability.  Again,
concession systems allow the risks inherent to the action of private enterprise to be reduced.
Finally, there is a problem associated with the management of capacity. This problem is
easily eliminated in the case of vertically integrated companies.
On the other hand, the problem is not so simple for systems of competitive access or
of  separation.  In  this  case,  the  problem  is  increased  for  companies  with  high  traffic
densities and conflicting demands for capacity. It is true that modem computer technology
can reduce the problem through the real time management of electronic systems. However,
when connecting systems have different dispatching priorities  and differing informational
qualities, it will be very difficult for any person or railway to plan and manage integrated
services across several systems.
2.5. - Design of concession contracts for railways.
In spite of the number of potential regulatory scenarios just described, few railways around
the world have been truly privatized. Instead, most countries have opted for concessioning
their rail  services and, in  some cases,  even their rail  infrastructures, to private  firnms  in
exchange for a fixed payment.'"  This restructuring form has been favored because it allows
the government to retain ultimate control over the assets while the private sector carries out
day-to-day  operations  according  to  some  pre-specified  rules  devised  in  a  contract
(Thompson and Budin, 1997), from which the problems associated to traditional regulation
are transformed  into  issues of  contract  enforcement.  Since the  number  of  variables  to
consider is  large, rail  concession contracts  cannot  be reduced,  in  general,  into a  single
standard model. However, according to the existing experiences, Box 2.5 proposes six key
variables to consider.
The first critical aspect to determine in a concession is its type, both in its vertical
(or  functional)  size and  its  horizontal  (or  geographical)  one,  according  to  the  features
already described in Section 2.3. The most often used approach in recent concessions in the
rail industry has been to create smaller packages attending to the horizontal dimension of
the industry in the country. For example, rail freight systems in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
or Colombia were split into several regional companies, and Chilean railways were broken
down  into  four  passenger  companies  and  two  freight  companies  with  a  separate
infrastructure firn.  All these countries have also used economic criteria in designing the
The list of countries with actual or planned rail concessions  include, among others, United Kingdom,
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, C6te  d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso,
Cameroon,  Congo,  Malawi,  Jordan  and Mozambique.
- 18 -size of the concessioning package, taking into account the profitability of different lines. In
Europe,  functional  separation  between  infrastructure  and  services  has  been  preferred
instead, particularly since the European Commission Directive 91/440 and its  follow-on
orders. In its most extreme degree, this form of concessioning of rail services was used in
the privatization of British Rail, which also included the private provision and management
of rail infrastructures. A less extensive vertical separation approach has been developed in
Sweden and other European countries, where the infrastructure has not been auctioned off
to private firms (Lundberg, 1996).
Box 2.5. Key variables in designing rail concession contracts.
The second key issue in designing the contract for concessioning rail services and
infrastructures is correctly defining the award process and the duration of the concession. If
precision in procurement and sustainability against legal challenge is to be achieved in the
design of concession contracts for the rail industry, common sense suggests that everything
in the contract should be unambiguously defined. This includes a number of dimensions,
such  as the rules  for the  auction and the criteria  defining how each concession will be
awarded  to  a  private  company  or  a  consortium  of  companies.  In practice,  there  are  a
- 19  -number of elements to choose among, such as, for example, the award criterion between
maximum  payment  to  government  (or  minimum  payment  by  government,  in  negative
concessions) and minimum tariff. There can also be a choice between unrestricted bidding
and bidding that involves some sort of pre-qualification, together with the exact choice of
the type of auction (see Guislain and Kerf, 1995, and Kerf et al., 1997).
In the privatization of former British Rail, for example, the process of concessioning
began  with  a  pre-qualification  stage,  followed  by  a  formal  invitation  to  tender  for  a
particular package. After indicative bids had been received, a short-listing process occurred,
usually with four bidders remaining. One of these was subsequently named as the preferred
bidder, and was given around a fortnight to complete financing and other organizational
arrangements before being confirmed as a winner. At that point, the regulator gave public
details of the bid, in terms of the subsidy required and the service improvements promised.
With  respect  to  the  bidding  mechanisms,  there  is  an  extensive  literature  and
experience on different auction forms. Single, sealed enveloped bids are the simplest form
to avoid collusion and obtain higher bids, but more complex approaches, such as real time
auctions, have been used in some transport concessions (for example, the Brazilian fieight
railways). Once the rules have been setup and bids submission requested, bidders should
have a period of study in order to form their own valuations according to the potential gains
to be  extracted from the concession. Early research  by Preston et al.  (1996) for United
Kingdom indicated that their key issues for the bidders were the length of franchises, the
level of competition that would face from other operators, the separation of infrastructure
from  services and the costs (including new investments) associated to their maintenance
and the own mechanisms and selecting criteria of the bidding process.
Although the guiding principle should be to maximize competition so that the most
efficient firm ends up winning the award,  it is clear that there is not a single method to
select the winner once the bids have been submitted, and the final choice will depend on the
regulator's  objectives, which should be explicit and based on transparent criteria. Thus, if
the government intends that private participation should be a means of reducing the burden
on the public purse for the provision  of rail  services, it must  use  fiscal benefits as the
greatest criterion, and it will look at who needs the lowest subsidy or who offers the highest
auction price. In Brazil, for example, the six regional rail concessions were  successfully
auctioned  to  highest  bid  above  the  government's  stipulated  minimum  price.
Concessionaires were required to make an up-front payment immediately after the auction
and then a stream of pre-determined payments over the life of the concession. Similarly, in
Britain, minimizing subsidy payments appeared to drive the regulator's  choice for winning
bidders, especially in the first concessions. Other criteria were the financial position of the
tenderer,  its  managerial  competence  and  its  operational proposals.  In  any  case, regular
payments or subsidies can be made dependent on the firm's performance, so as to maintain
a degree of flexibility that favor the development of the industry (Preston, 1996).
Alternatively, if the regulator sets the tariffs and defines the quality of service iin  the
contract,  bids  can  be  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  the  lower  cost  provider  whilst
simultaneously  including  penalties  for  the  case  of  not  achieving  certain  performance
objectives. These social  objectives can be  also targeted by  focusing  on the bids  which
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to final users, provided this fare can be properly defined. Sometimes, as in the case of rail
freight, the traffic  mix makes the price  structure  very complex, so that  this mechanism
becomes impractical.  Moreover, using  tariffs as  an award  criterion for rail  concessions
limits  later possibilities  of regulatory  interventions  on prices and demands  an adequate
definition of quality standards.
Many concessions in the rail industry have been awarded using a multicriteria points
formulae, where  it is possible  to take  into account  a  larger number of objectives. This
method  was used  in  Argentina,  where  the  bids  for the  six  freight  packages that  were
concessioned were evaluated using the net present value of the canon to  be paid to the
government during  the first fifteen years  of the concession, the quality  of business and
investment plans, staffing levels, the proposed track fee for passenger trains, and the share
of  Argentine  interest  in  the  consortium.  The  weighting  of  these  criteria  reflected  the
importance attributed to  investment in  the  railways, but  also  political  compromises on
employment.
The rule of keeping things simpler was later adopted for the award of metropolitan
commuter  railways  in  order  to  make  the  bidding  process  and  the  final  selection  as
transparent as possible and not to induce exaggerated or misleading assumptions. Thus, the
Argentinean authorities learned from the freight concession experience that trying to select
the winning bid through numerous cumbersome criteria with discretional weights was more
likely to reduce the efficiency of the bidding process than to improve it. Instead, the terms
of the concession should be made  clear and known to  all potential  bidders and bidding
should take place on the basis of a single parameter, which  encompassed the economic
assumptions made by the bidders in relation to the terms of the concession. In the case of
the  metropolitan  railways  concession,  for  instance,  each  concessionaire  calculated  her
expected revenue from operations, then compared it with the capital investment programs
and finally estimated the subsidy amount to be requested (The World Bank, 1996).
With  regard to  the  optimal duration  of  the  concession contract,  the tradeoff  is
evident in terms of efficiency, since the shorter the concession, the more immediate the
competitive pressure, but the less the incentive to invest and develop the business. Longer
concessions, in contrast, tend to diminish the regulator's  enforcement capacity and soften
the incentives to promote efficient outcomes. The general rule is to adapt the concession
period to the economic life of the assets and to make this compatible with the objectives of
the regulator.  This  balance often creates  conflict. Thus, while  concessionaires  argue in
general for long contracts on the grounds that this provides them with incentives to build up
the business and purchase or replace long-lived assets, regulators prefer shorter lengths to
favor the achievement of efficiency (by the implicit threat of not renewal) and fiscal goals
(since the canon or auction price may be increased after the first years of the concession).
Only if sunk investments are minimal and asset re-utilization is possible, are shorter periods
advisable  for  particular  rail  services  (those  related  to  signals,  track  and  station
maintenance).
Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson (1996) point out that the average duration of rail
concessions is about five or ten years when they refer only to services and up to thirty when
-21  -network  investment  and  development  are  included.  The  figures  vary  from  country  to
country. In Argentina, for example, the six freight packages created were concessioned on a
thirty-year term, with an optional ten-year extension, due to the poor state of infrastructures
and the huge investment that was required. The international rail link between CMte  d'Ivoire
and Burkina Faso was awarded in a fifteen-year concession for similar reasons. Conversely,
the train-operating companies  in the United Kingdom  were granted a  concession to run
passenger services for a period of only between seven to fifteen years.
After  the  duration  period  has  expired,  the  contract  must  also  specify  several
termination  arrangements in  order  to  avoid any  disruption to  railway  services. A  first
possibility is to make automatic renewals in case new candidates for the concession cdo  not
exist. The regulator should not compromise on this before the concession ends in order to
ensure that the incumbent has the correct incentives. New auctioning seems the standard
procedure after a concession has ended, but most rail operators will seek a renegotiation of
duration terms while the contract is still in force. An example of this strategy was given by
some United Kingdom rail franchises, who argued that they made long-lived investments in
high-quality wagons and locomotives when they asked for a license extension.
Since  renegotiation  costs  money,  but  a  lack  of  renegotiation  might  end  in
deteriorated performance, the concession contract should specify the circumstances under
which renegotiation is possible and desirable, and which party should initiate the process. A
pre-scheduled revision process, if certain intermediate objectives are achieved, might help
to reduce both parties'  risks.  Although the contract will always be  incomplete, standard
clauses should include the behavior under  unforeseen changes in demand conditions, the
responses  to  not  anticipated  rises  in  energy  or  labor  costs,  etc.  In  Argentina,  freight
concessions, for example, could not fulfill their promise to invest about $1.2 billion in the
rail network over fifteen years due to unexpected falling traffic levels.
In all cases, a  flexible mechanism for contract renegotiation is required, since the
regulator  sometimes  faces  the  dilemma  of  enforcing  contracts  to  the  detriment  of  the
operating  companies  and  the  national  rail  system,  or  he  might  have  to  reschledule
investment and make  other compromises  at the cost  of undermining  his  credibility  for
enforcing the agreements in the future (Carbajo and Estache, 1996).
One  of  the  most  critical  issues  in  designing  a  rail  concession  contract  is  the
attribution of rights and obligations to the parties. On one side, the private operator winning
the  concession pays  a regular canon or receives  a subsidy,  and is awarded the right to
operate train services and/or manage its infrastructure (including future investments') with
certain exclusivity rights that (totally or partially) protect her from other rail competitors.
On the other hand, in exchange for the payment or the compensating subsidy, the
regulator promises to monitor the overall performance of the sector and provide a stable
framework  for  current  and  future  rail  operations,  which  may  include  infrastructure
provisions if this was auctioned off to private firms. In fact, a large part of railway activities
might be concessioned. These include, in infrastructure: track, signals and stations, yards,
shops; in  operating  equipment: locomotives, wagons,  carriages; and in  general  services
access to track, route and schedule information, and maintenance. The exact form in which
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achieved by the parties.
According  to  a  service  contract,  for  example,  the  train  operators  provide  rail
transport services for passengers or (rarely) freight that are fully specified by the regulatory
authority,  in  terms  of  routes  to  be  served  and  the  minimum  quality  and  technical
requirements.  The  operators  may  also  cover  some  investment  costs  and  carry  some
commercial risk. This risk can be integrated into a net cost contract, where the operator
keeps all the revenues generated by the passenger or freight traffic. This type of contract,
where the operator carries revenue as well as cost risk, often generates more traffic and is
let to the most attractive bid, but offers a higher incentive to predate. Alternatively, gross
cost contracts specify that all revenue accrues to the government and the contracts are let on
the basis of the least total cost supplier; thus, operators carry cost risk, but no revenue risk.
The experience in the United Kingdom with regard to passenger franchises suggests that
gross cost contracts generate more bids per tender (particularly from new entrants), offer
greater  incentives to  public  revenue  generation,  reduce  the  administrative  cost  for  the
regulatory  authority, and  support any  fares scheme, with  modal  integration  and quality
control.
The regulator may retain control over and responsibility for common functions, and
its main role should be mostly restricted to regulating quality (in terms of service, safety,
environmental  and  technical  standards),  to  control  monopolistic  behavior  (in  terms  of
abusive prices or services), and to determine the overall characteristics of the functioning of
the  sector  (in  terms  of  coordination  at the  national  and  international  level)  under  the
competition  rules or rights  established for  all firms as well as antitrust  and commercial
legislation.
The form in which the exclusivity rights  associated to rail concessions have been
implemented varies in  each country. In Argentina, the  rail freight  concessionaires have
exclusive use of the tracks but must  grant access to  passenger operations in return for a
compensatory track fee. In Chile, passenger services and infrastructure initially remained in
public hands, whereas freight concessions were awarded to private firms competing with
each  other.  Particularly,  in  the  C6te  d'Ivoire-Burkina  Faso  trans-national  railway,  the
fifteen-year concession  was awarded  with  a  single seven-year  exclusivity  period,  after
which  the operator must grant track access, for an agreed  fee, to  any third-party carrier
specified by the regulator.
Thus,  exclusivity  rights  should  be  viewed  as  another  instrument  of  regulatory
control, and not  taken as granted by  the firms  ex-ante. By  limiting the  duration of the
monopoly period, a balance is struck between the regulator's  desire to reap the benefits of
allowing competitive access to the tracks, and the private train operators'  preferences for
full control over the market in  order to  generate profits  and make  forecasting revenues
easier.  In  general,  most  railways  have  been  concessioned  on  an  exclusive  basis  in
geographical  areas,  as  in  Argentina  or  Brazil,  with  possibly  some  access  rights  for
connecting railways to certain (central or strategic) track segments. This has been due to the
geopolitical configuration of the country, the density of the existing network, and the need
for promoting competition in major markets (as in Mexico) or for non-competing services
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With respect to  the  concessionaires' obligations, the  private provision of  rail
transport services, particularly when they pertain to less developed  areas or zones with
historical structural deficits in track network, cannot always be separated from public
subsidization  or compensation  in reciprocity for public service obligations  imposed with
political criteria. In these cases, the  concession contract for loss-making but  socially
necessary services  must  clearly  include these  arrangements, in  terms  of  detailed
performance  levels to be attained by the firm, and may even be designed in order ito  be
awarded to the company  willing to provide the specified services for the lowest level of
subsidy  (negative  concessions),  as in Argentina.
As a final feature in defining the rights and obligations  of the concessionaires,  the
current  experience  of rail concessions  in South America  show that the restructuring  process
has often lowered  employment  levels. Although,  in principle,  this should not be a relevant
feature for operating  the sector once it is privatized,  in practice  it becomes  one of the most
difficult  obstacles  to hinder the private  participation  of rail operators  in certain  countries.  In
Brazil,  for example,  big redundancies  were inevitable  and were taken in two phases.  Before
concessioning,  incentive  schemes  for early retirements  were in place. After the concession
was awarded the former national rail operator paid involuntary  separation grants to the
remaining  redundant  staff not hired by the concessionaire.  From then on, compensation  for
any additional  employees  laid off is the responsibility  of the private operator.  Undoubtedly,
any constraint  to the service, either on employment  or on other productive  factors will be
reflected  in the auction  price of the concession.
In summary,  in their general form, rail concessions  define the most advantageous
form to solve the challenges  posed by the new regulatory  environment  in which the rail
industry  is currently  placed. It usually  adopts  the form of a long and medium  term contract
in which a vertically or horizontally  integrated package of (passenger  and/or freight) rail
services is auctioned off to private firms, while economic  assets remain public property.
Three  of its key features  - type, duration  and contents  - have been described  in this section,
but there remain three other particular aspects of this concession  contract design that, by
their own importance  in the regulation  of the rail industry,  deserve particular  treatment in
the following  sections. First, in Section 3, price regulation, in terms of defining the most
important  issues to establish  effective  and well-oriented  price control  mechanisms  within a
concession  contract.  Second,  quality regulation,  studied  in Section  4 and including  both its
static dimension (quality of  service, safety  and  environmental issues) and  dynamic
dimension (rules for infrastructure  investment and financing).  Finally, Section 5 will be
devoted  to  those  aspects related  to  the  coordination between  infrastructure and
superstructure  in the rail industry.
3. - PRICE  REGULATION  IN THE RAIL  INDUSTRY.
According  to well-established  economic  principles,  in order to make the most efficient  use
of the resources available  in an economy,  the price charged for any rail transport service
should match  the opportunity  cost of its provision.  This is the economic  efficiency  or  first
-24 -best criterion around which traditional regulation of the rail industry has been defined in the
past.  Thus, the main focus of government regulation in this  industry was the control of
market power through regulated prices envisaged to limit the degree of monopolistic abuse
of a particular railroad. The exact form of tariff control (official approval of rates with little
or null degree of financial autonomy) depended in each case on the nature of the sector, the
ownership of the assets, the complexity of the regulated service, and the social and political
pressures to keep the firm's financial equilibrium in the medium and long run.
In practice, however, this opportunity cost pricing rule entailed huge measurement
difficulties  and,  in  particular,  in  industries  with  large  economies  of  scale  such  as the
railways, yielded uneconomic losses (Amstrong, Cowan and Vickers,  1994), as described
in Section 1. Therefore, this form of regulation was complemented by a number of standard
price mechanisms devised by economic theory to substitute the ideal efficiency criterion of
pricing each unit of service at the exact cost of its provision.
Price discrimination policies, for example, were, and still are, common in transport,-
either by type (students or elderly tariffs, frequent or commuter travelcards), number of
consumers (group discounts), type or volume of freight (cargo rebates for some goods) or
by time in the day or season (peak-load prices). The use of two-part tariffs, with one fixed
component  and  a  variable  one,  is  also  a  common tariff  policy  in  which  each unit  of
consumption (for example, a single trip) is priced differently. All these mechanisms allow
for a greater flexibility for the railways and increase their revenues without much affecting
their  costs,  but  both  their  social  acceptability  and  the  informational  requirements they
demand can limit the extent of its application.
In  the  new  regulatory  environment  defined  in  the  previous  section,  in  which
separation  of the  infrastructure from  services  can be  relatively  easily  achieved, and  in
which  a  notable  degree  of  private  participation  in  rail  management  exists  through
concession contracts, pricing principles must be put in practice by means of concrete rules
within the contract.
Since  rail  concessionaires  are  now  able  to  set  prices  more  or  less  freely,  the
concession contract should include a procedure to control the prices set by operators. These
price control mechanisms should be set, in general, according to three key factors: (i) the
degree  of  monopoly  power  effectively  conferred  to  the  operator;  (ii)  the  extent  of
government  non-commercial  objectives  previously  defined  in  the  concession  award
procedure;  and  (iii)  the  possible  existence  of  limiting  factors,  such  as  intermodal
competition. This latter element is particularly relevant in the case of rail freight operations
(intermodal competition from trucking),'2 but in the case of passenger traffic (particularly
the commuter and regional one) social pressures to keep fares low usually dominate many
price  interventions. In practice,  the most  common  alternatives  (second  best criteria)  to
control prices in rail concessions are rate of return regulation and price cap mechanisms.
12 For exarnple,  in Argentina  railways  only  carried  8%  of total freight  tons-km  at the time of concessioning.  In
Chile,  where  the average  haul distance  does not favor rail.
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Rate of return regulation is particularly used in railroads in Canada, Japan and the United
States. The  principle  behind this  type  of  regulation  is  to  constrain  prices  so that  the
regulated rail transport operator earns only a fair rate of return on its capital investment.
Under rate of return regulation, the regulator typically  determines a revenue requirement
based on a firm's  accounting total costs during a test year, according to the variable costs
and  an  estimate of  the  cost  of capital  to  the  firm,  given by  a  "reasonable"  rate  level
multiplied by a rate base (Liston, 1997).
I Revenue  requirement Total  Cost  (Variabte  Cost)+  (Rate Level  x Rate Base)
Thus, rate of return regulation has three components: the rate base, the allowed rate
level, and the rate structure. The rate base refers to the investments that are allowed to earn
a rate of return; the rate level refers to the relation of overall revenues to costs, and the rate
structure determines  how  individual prices  are  set  for  different  services  or  customers.
Determining the first of these three components is often the most important regulatory task
under this form of regulation, since inadequate calculations of the rate base might either
jeopardize the survival of the firm or allow it to earn excessive profits. In practice, the rate
base usually includes most fixed costs less depreciation and working capital.
Three characteristics should govern the definition of the asset rate base affected by
the regulatory activity. First, with respect to the treatment of past investments carried out by
the railroad before the regulatory period,13 it should be consistent and transparent in order
to ensure that assets are not expropriated ex post  by an opportunistic regulatory behavior,
which  would  increase the cost  of capital required  by  investors.  Second, with  regard to
future investments,  and their associated expected operating  expenditures  and costs, they
should  be  considered  into  the  asset  base  definition  inasmuch  as  they  do  not  imply
"excessive" investment and only when they are fully incorporated to the firm. Finally, with
respect  to  current investments,  the problem  lies in  determining the  value  of the firm's
capital. If the existing  assets were transferable to  other activities without  cost, then the
conceptual problem of determining their value would be simple: their replacement cost or
resale value. At the other extreme, and more frequent in the rail industry, is the case where
existing assets are sunk, so that the opportunity cost of using them in their present activity
is zero. Then, if the regulator seeks maximal efficiency, it should ensure that rate of return
structure (and, indirectly, prices) are set to cover future avoidable costs.
Since most of the assets currently used by railways are sunk and financed before the
concessioning process, both of these solutions are troublesome. Market values are mnuch
lower than replacement costs so that this valuation would yield large price increases and
windfall gains for private  stakeholders at the expense of consumers. On the other hand,
attributing a zero value to  the existing assets would make the  windfall gains  go in  the
13  This is often the case in many restructuring  processes, when a forrner state-participated  railway has
transferred  its assets  to private  concessionaires.
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investments  with such a lower real return. A tentative  method  to address  this problem is to
use some average  procedure  that consider either  a financial  projection  of what will happen
with the future rate base or calculate  indicative  values by estimating  the cash-flows  that the
firm  would  have earned  had the regulatory  regime remain  unchanged.
Despite its numerous  advantages  within the traditional  price regulation  mechanisms
(mainly in terms of simplicity),  three additional problems  are associated  with this sort of
regulation. First, there is little incentive for productive efficiency, since firms can pass
production  costs onto final users in the form of higher prices; second,  it leads to excessive
investment  and capital use because the firm is guaranteed a return on investment; 14 and,
finally, the high degree of discretion usually enjoyed by the regulator in determining  the
rate base and the rate of return reduces incentives  for rent-seeking  behavior on the part of
the regulated  firm.
3.2. - Price cap regulation  mechanisms
The most conrmon  alternative  to the standard  rate of return regulation  is the use of cost-plus
incentives  that, in practice,  take the form of a menu of costs reimbursement  rules in which
firms would self-select  themselves  according  to their preferences  for sharing  the operating
costs with the regulator. 15 The basic aim of these mechanisms  is to favor  the achievement
of dynamic  efficiency  (in the sense of the regulated  firm achieving  the lowest  unit cost in
the long run) by sharing  some  of the rents due to efficiency  improvements  between  the firm
and the regulator.
There are several ways to accomplish this goal, and implement its results. For
example,  the sliding  scale plans used in the United  Kingdom  Railtrack's regulation  consist
of a price adjustment  mechanism  through  which  the actual rate of return earned  by the firm
is adapted  to changes  in productivity  according  to a variable  parameter.
Price-cap regulation is another incentive  method used both in railways and other
privatized utilities. In its most standard form, it consists in setting traditional maximum
price schemes designed according to long-run marginal costs in order to offer a firm an
incentive  to achieve the goal of dynamic efficiency while maintaining all or part of the
gains associated  with the future increases  of efficiency  by the firm. This mechanism  was
born as a consequence  of the criticism  directed  at the lack of cost minimization  embedded
in rate of return regulation  and other  traditional  price regulation  mechanisms.  However,  its
efficiency  gains  have to be balanced  with the higher informational  rents that it implies (De
Rus, 1998).
There are a number of minor variations of the price-cap system. One of the most
developed  ones in the rail industry  is the RPI-X formula.  In this setup,  the price for a basket
of the firm prices can increase in any one year by no more than the increase  in the retail
14  This is the so-called Averch-Johnson  or capital-bias  effect, which is not particularly  adverse in less
developed  economies  whose capital  needs  are seldom  fulfilled.
15 See  Guasch  and Spiller  (1996)  for detailed  examples  in other industries.
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IL  rc  ￿  ￿  e  Price  (  i)  xRi - X)  'l
In the  case of  multiproduct  activities,  this  expression  can be  easily  adapted  by
requiring that a certain weighted average of percentage price increases not exceed the rate
of growth of the RPI less X percent. The weight for each price can be defined according to
the share  in total  revenue of  each product or,  alternatively, it can be  imposed that  the
average revenue (calculating with accounting figures) can grow by at most RPI-X. Thus,
the regulator can control the prices of multiproduct firms by focusing on their revenues,
correcting them according to  adequate weights. It  sets the price  for a certain number of
years starting with a reference price often calculated according to rate of return criteria.
In  the  United  Kingdom,  for  example  the  price  cap  mechanism,  in  its  RPI-X
formulae,  has  been  applied  to  passengers  traffic  franchisees.1 6 Commuter  fares  are
regulated with  respect to a basket containing all relevant fares, weighed broadly by the
income that the operator derives from each. From three years from January 1996, increases
in the capped fares are not permitted to be more than the retail price index increase frorn the
1995 base price; for the years from January 1999 the price cap is planned at RPI-l%.
The purpose  of  this  method  is  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  regulated  rail
operator, allowing the firm to earn substantial profits by improving their efficiency while
simultaneously financing current and future operations. This implies that, in practice, when
setting the level of a price cap, the rail regulator must consider several factors: the cost of
capital,  the value  of the  existing  assets,  the  future  investment programs,  the expected
changes in  productivity, estimates of demand  growth, and,  perhaps,  the effect  of X on
actual  and  potential  competitors.  Some  of  these  are common  to  other price-regulation
mechanisms  and, in particular, they are needed when using rate of  return regulation, as
described above.
There are different procedures and  rules to  deal with each of them.  The cost  of
capital  and  the  value  of  existing  assets  can  be  calculated  using  standard  financial
techniques. The future investment program and its implications depends on both expected
changes in  productivity  and  estimated  demand  that  can be  obtained  from  econometric
techniques or simpler projection and analysis of historical data. Finally, the effect of the
price-cap on the future shape of the market must be conjectured from past experiences or
yardstick comparisons.
One of the most  critical issues is the setting and resetting  of the productivity X-
factor. A possible method consists in using  indexes or indicators (as those described in
Section 6) to measure the difference between aggregate rates of growth  of outputs  and
inputs and therefore by the residual calculate productivity. Again, econometrics can provide
alternatives for estimating cost functions and their corresponding productivity parameters
16 RPI-X  is also  used  for  access  pricing,  as will  be described  in Section  5.
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initial price ceilings, which are first imposed on the firm after a switch of regime, is critical.
If the  caps  are too  high,  then too  little  of the  surplus is transferred  to  consumers  and
deadweight losses are huge. If they are set too low, the firm may be unable to break even. It
may then have difficulty in attracting capital, and its service quality may deteriorate.
Another important element of RPI-X regulation is the existence of cost passthrough
provisions, through which the firm can translate to their customers unexpected increases in
certain factors outside its control. Although these clauses are standard in the regulation of
other utilities, they are not frequent in the rail industry. The most plausible case could be
given  by  energy  costs,  for  which  a  certain  percentage  (100%  or  less)  of  the  cost
passthrough onto the customers could be established in the concession contract.
In summary, the pricing  principles traditionally  used in  the rail industry  are not
particularly different from standard economic principles. On the contrary, they have been
extensively used as examples for other transport modes or economic sectors. Both rate of
return regulation and price-cap mechanisms are the most commonly used price-regulation
schemes in the rail industry nowadays, and they represent a form of price control in which,
as opposed to the traditional regulation, some commercial freedom is given to the regulated
firm. Although rarely implemented in their purest forms, rate of return regulation and price
caps  (in  its  most  developed  form  of  RPI-X)  center  most  of  the  debate  and  practical
experiences in rail concessions.
These methods are valid not only for limiting monopoly profits earned in passengers
or freight traffics, but also in the control of infrastructure access prices, as will be shown in
Section 5. Finally, since tariffs control could easily be cheated on quality grounds, quality
requirements  become  essential  for  monitoring  the  overall  performance  of  the  rail
concessionaire. This is precisely the objective of the following section.
4. - QUALITY REGULATION IN THE RAIL INDUSTRY.
Quality performance is not neutral for the economic contribution of the rail transport sector
to the social welfare. The particular level of quality achievement of the train operators and
their particular features in regard to the three main dimensions that broadly define quality in
the rail industry (service, externalities and investment) critically determine the value added
by this transport mode. The first question that naturally arises is why quality regulation is
needed at all in this industry, and to what extent this regulation relates to standard price
regulation mechanisms described in previous  sections. Economic theory provides  a well-
known argument to answer these questions: real world transport activities are characterized
by market failures due to informational problems.'7
In an ideal world with a large number of competitive rail transport service providers
and well-informed consumers of passenger and freight transport services, quality regulation
would not be required since market forces would gradually adjust the consumers' wishes or
17 There  exists  an extensive  literature  on this topic. See,  for example,  Stigler  (1987)  and references  herein.
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supplies. Thus, if no price correction takes place, less punctual or unreliable rail companies,
or those with poorer freight management performance, would be driven out the market and
only  those  whose  price-quality  ratios  were  in  accordance with  demand would  remain.
However, when full information no longer exists, markets cannot exert this disciplinary role
on the firms and purely competitive solutions are not always positive in terms of quality (or
price  or  output).  Unsafe,  unreliable  or  unpleasant  services  may  result  under  pure
competition of rail transport operators, since the limited availability of adequate resources
and the lack of adequate control mechanisms make it impossible to adjust consumers'  and
producers'  interests.
In the case of the traditional organization of the rail industry some years ago, as a
monopolistic structure with a single firm providing services at the national or local level,
the price-quality adjustment problems may even increase, since the monopoly's  privately
optimal level of quality may not coincide with social standards in many cases. Simple price
regulation seldom suffices to solve this question. Any regulated multiproduct monopolist in
an environment of asymmetric information tends to degrade qualities in order to achieve a
larger level of profits once it has entered the market. Railway firms are not immune to this
temptation,  with  quality  of service  specified,  for  example, in  terms of  punctuality  and
cancellation standards. In particular, and not just for the rail sector, the quality outcome of
any monopolist heavily depends on the specific method of regulation adopted. For example,
under a rate of return regulation, overinvesting in non-required technological quality may
accentuate the Averch-Johnson effect. Alternatively, under a price-cap regulation, a subtle
cut in quality can be a very tempting way of cutting costs (Carbajo, Estache and Kennedy,
1997).
Therefore,  the  price  regulation  mechanisms  analyzed  in  Section  4  should  be
considered incomplete if they do not include quality provisions. This is not always an easy
task in practice, since adjusting those price mechanisms by quality may result in making
them inoperative or excessively difficult to manage by the firm or to monitor by an external
regulator. For this reason, instead of correcting price control mechanisms, most regulators
determine the quality standards or targets to be accomplished by train operators.
4.1. - Definition of quality targets in the rail industry.
In setting up those quality standards incorporated in the design of concession contracts, the
regulator  often makes use of the principles  envisaged in  yardstick competition.18 These
quality standards may be constructed at the national or regional  level with  inter-industry
comparisons (as in  Brazil  or Chile with  regard to  many of  their public  utilities) or  by
establishing international benchmarks or best practices (as in Australia with regard to  its
transport services and infrastructures).
18 To avoid  the problem  of regulator's  capture  and the discretionality  of the regulatory  action.  However,  there
is a risk  of making  undue  comparisons  between  different  rail systems.
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other transport modes, quality is mainly measured in concrete service levels or specified
service  standards.  However,  this  measurement  is  suited  more  for  factors  such  as  the
punctuality of trains, the reliability of aboard services and the waiting time  at stations or
platforms, than it is for other factors.19 Simultaneously, the services provided before the
transport itself, such as ticketage, reservations, or luggage or cargo handling at stations or
wagons are often ignored as part of the value chain of the railway industry, although they
may constitute relevant aspects of both intramodal and intermodal competition. For these
reasons, the first element to consider in designing a quality control in the rail industry is an
integrated vision of the transport service that includes not only the ride itself, but also all
aspects related to infrastructure (track and stations), stations and pre-transport and post-
transport services provided to clients.
Secondly, a further aspect of quality regulation  with particular relevance  for the
railways, is the flexibility with which scheduled services can be changed, or new services
introduced in response to changes in the levels or patterns of demand. The rail industry has
always  been at a  disadvantage to  roads  and  air in  this  respect because  of the need to
coordinate  working  timetables  and  operations  within  certain  technical  requirements
characterized by a lack of alternative routes between two points.
Hence, it is not  very easy (with  a few number of increasing exceptions in many
countries) for rail transport to offer on-demand services to passengers (for example, as done
by charter airlines) or cargo customers (with door-to-door services) unless the rail network
allows it. Coordination is thus particularly relevant for quality of service regulation within
the rail firm itself, and must also be considered when designing the industry structure. For
example, one potential disadvantage of the split between infrastructure and operations is
that this  might  become  even more  difficult when  such  changes  have to  be  negotiated
between different organizations, especially where approval of timetable changes also needs
to be secured from other train operators using conflicting train paths.
With regard to  other industries, intermodal coordination is also needed, since the
evaluation of social quality performance is always done in relation to feasible alternatives.
Saturated corridors (where the investments in roads, railways and airports clearly overcome
the demand) are a waste of resources that few economies can assume. This almost general
equilibrium  approach to  evaluating  quality  constitutes  the  third  element  of the  quality
regulation process, although, in this case, this is not particular to this industry. The socio-
political implications of quality regulation (in terms of equity or public service obligations
and the social acceptance of quality standards) determnine  at last the overall quality targets
to be established in each industry.
19  For example,  railway  track can deteriorate  with  respect  to the smoothness  of the ride provided,  or the noise
or vibration  generated  to passengers  and third  parties (buildings  close to the tracks),  even  though  punctuality
and or safety  are not  jeopardized,  so there might  be incentives  to reduce maintenance  standards  in this respect.
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Taking into account these three characteristics, Box 4.1 summarizes the five most
important quality dimensions for the railway industry (vehicle, route, service, social and
dynamic  quality)  together  with  a  number  of  standard  performance  measurement
instruments for them. The three first dimensions (vehicle, route and service) are related to
what is usually named quality of service, whereas the other two refer to externalities in a
static and dynamic sense.
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Regulation of the quality of rail transport services in those  aspects regarding the vehicle
quality, the transport service itself (aboard trains) and the pre-transport and post-transport
services has  been  dealt  with  in  different  depth  in  most  countries  although,  as  it  was
described in Section 2, there is a positive correlation between the extent of the restructuring
activity  in  the  rail  industry  (in  terms  of  private  participation  and/or  separation  of
infrastructure from services) and the quality regulation requirement imposed to the post-
restructuring industry.
In general, countries where the sector is still heavily dependent on government or
public agencies have done less to establish a separate quality control framework (as in some
countries in Eastern Europe or Asia), whereas in those where private participation has been
significant (the case of United Kingdom, for example) a detailed system of quality control
has been setup. In all cases, the basic principle governing the design of quality mechanisms
is that customer service should be paramount if railways are to maximize profitability and
compete with alternative modes of transport. The economic relationship between separate
units  in a railway enterprise  should be structured to  ensure that  incentives to maximize
customer service are preserved (see Swift, 1  997a, 1  997b).
This is particularly relevant with respect to  the separation between  infrastructure
and operations. Vertical unbundling in railways distances infrastructure management from
the end-user  customer and  it could yield  undesirable  side  effects or contradictions. For
example, the density of traffic (trains run per day) that maximizes returns on infrastructure
investment is likely to be greater than the level that is optimal from the point of view of
operators. This is because at high densities, passenger  service is likely to  suffer through
congestion.  Therefore,  no  matter  whether  separation  is  institutional  or  only  financial,
mechanisms to compensate infrastructure units from running below optimal capacity must
be incorporated in contracts in order to maximize the end-user customer performance as a
whole. Since the particular characteristics of the rail industry in each country requires a fine
tuning adjustment of any regulatory or contract enforcement mechanism, Box 4.2 proposes
a  simple scheme that identifies and  separates the roles to  be assigned  to the regulatory
agency and the operators (either franchisees or public or private monopolies) with regard to
the quality of service regulation.
After its reform and full privatization of services and  track provision, the United
Kingdom rail system constitutes one of the most practical examples of a detailed quality of
service regulation framework in the sense defined by Box 4.2. For example, in the case of
passenger transport, the regulatory agency (Office for  Passenger Rail Franchising, OPRAF)
defines what level of service would be tendered  for a particular route or corridor. It also
sets  the  minimum  level  of  service  for  every  route  in  the  country  (not  only  timetable
specifications,  but  also journey  time,  first  and  last departure  times,  etc.)  If franchisees
operate a poorer service than specified then the OPRAF reserves the right to withhold the
grant.
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Operators awarded with licenses, Train Operating Companies (TOCs), are obliged
to include in their timetable certain passenger service requirements set out in the franchise
agreement. These are the minimum standards of quality that operators need to  achieve to
ensure a basic provision of services. However, these requirements do not specify detailed
timetables  for  each  route  in  order  to  avoid  excessively  limiting  the  freedom  of  the
operators, and instead set out parameters within which each company must design its own
timetable. Passenger service requirements are set  out by route and  are largely based  on
former  British  Rail's  timetable,  specifying  frequency  of  trains,  stations  to  be  served,
maximum journey times, first and last trains, weekend services, through services, and load
factors/peak train  capacity (for commuter services). Passenger  service requirements also
include limits on the total number of train cancellations and, where applicable, on the level
of capacity which needs to be provided. These limits apply in any 28-day reporting period,
with three levels determined: (i) a call-in level, at which OPRAF reviews the performance
of the operator;  (ii)  a second level,  at which  the operator  is in breach  of the franchise
agreement, and (iii)  a third level, which can trigger default under the agreement.
With respect to other quality variables, compliance with load factor requirements,
for example,  is measured by reference to the ratio of passengers in excess of capacity to the
total  number of passengers (PIXC). The maximum  acceptable level of PIXC  is 3% for
morning and evening peak together, and 4.5% for either peak considered alone. If extra
capacity  is  needed  to  meet  load  factor  specifications,  the  cost  is  shared  between, the
operator and the OPRAF according to the following criteria:  (i) up to  a certain limit of
capacity increase the franchise payment does not change; (ii) between the initial limit and a
second limit OPRAF bears a share of costs, and finally (iii)  above the second limit all costs
are paid by OPRAF.
In practice, not all quality dimensions defined in Box 4.1 can be incorporated in the
same proportions to any service quality mechanism. The British system mainly focuses on
the route dimension and is based upon their extensive experience in deregulation. Whren  the
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separated,  several quality  regulation failures  may arise. The  most  important one  is the
failure in defining adequate and independent quality measures. This is the case of several
rail concessionaires in Argentina, where the level of vertical integration between the train
service providers and the maintenance firms (in the form of subsidiaries or units integrating
a larger industrial group) has distorted the incentives to provide the optimal price-quality
ratio in favor of more frequent repairs and technical updates.
4.1.2. - Safety and externalities.
Regulation  of  the  quality  of  service  is  only  one  of  the  two  static  aspects  of  quality
regulation to be considered in designing a global framework for quality regulation in the
rail  industry. The social  or external dimension of quality  regulation, which  includes all
safety and externalities related issues (pollution, congestion, etc.) is the other factor to take
into account,  and  it  specifically  differs  from the  level  of  service  dimension  of quality
regulation in at least four aspects.
The first element is the scope of regulation. Since non-compliance with the social
quality  standards  defined  in  Box  4.1  may  affect  users  and  non-users  of  the  transport
services, these standards should always be exogeneously set, and, in the case of the rail
industry, often by national or supranational legislation with intermodal implications. This is
not  always the case in  variables such as timetables,  load factors or vehicle size, which
usually  have  simple  intra-firm  consequences.  In  the  European  railway  industry,  for
example, three levels of quality regulation can be found: Directive 91/440 determined the
overall principles, and the obligation to comply with them was envisaged either in mode-
specific regulation (e.g. Railways Act in the United Kingdom) or in legislation that applies
to all sectors of the economy (e.g. Health and Safety Act).
The second factor that makes service quality regulation different from social quality
regulation in the rail industry relates to the regulatory approach that must be used in the
latter. Since the risks associated with accidents or potential environmental damages do not
only directly affect the private benefit, but also the social benefit of this transport mode,
there is a need for an external regulator or agency to take charge of coordinating safety and
reliability procedures at the industry or inter-industry level. This is particularly important
with respect to coordination when firms move from a public system to a deregulated one as
was  described  in  Section  2.  Furthermore,  in  the  railways  industry,  separation  of
infrastructure from services, and the introduction of open access, has made it necessary for
a rail track controller to  ensure safe co-ordination between different operators using the
same track or stations.
Again, using as an example the British railway system, their safety regulator is the
Health Safety Executive (HSE), which informs and gives advice to the Office of the Rail
Regulator  (ORR).  Operators  of  railway  services,  stations  and  networks  must  have  an
accepted safety case before the ORR approves their license. A safety case is a complete
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organizations and  systems. The private  infrastructure provider, Railtrack,  is required to
have  its  own  safety  case,  a  fundamental  component  of  which  is  Railtrack's  Safety
Management System, which is a system of standards for controlling operational procedures
and technical standards to ensure safety and safe interworking in Railtrack's infrastructure.
The third aspect  of particular  interest related to  safety regulation  in the railway
industry  is  the  assessment  and  assignment  of  risks.  Given  the  inherent  difficulties
associated to a strict monitoring process, there exist clear incentives for private providers of
rail transport services under quality regulation to subordinate their compliance with safety
requirements to the previous achievement of financial objectives.
In fact,  despite recent  tragedies  in  1998, railways traditionally  have had  a  high
public reputation for safety and this perception has converged with the statistical proof in
most countries. Therefore one could conclude that safety levels and management are quite
sufficient  and  no  particular  safety precaution  or  in-advance measures  should  be  taken.
However the public outcry, negative social effects and adverse public opinion to  single
catastrophes, together with the persistence of regular fatalities (staff accidents, passengers
joining and alighting from trains,...) make it impossible for the regulator to avoid designing
measures and policies aimed at diminishing both individual and social risks.
One  of  these  policies  relates  to  the  compulsory  insurance  against  third-party
liability, since it may correct the above described incentives to excessive risk taking by the
operators. In Europe, for example, Directive 95/18 required that operators of train services
have to obtain, together with the operating license and path allocations, a safety certificate
and  insurance.  The  insurance  arrangements  in  the  privatized  British  railway  industry
provide  another  example  of scope  of  liability  cover,  its  basis  and  conditions  for  self-
insurance. In this case, licenses for the private operators of railway assets (passenger trains,
freight trains, stations, and maintenance depots) contain a condition requiring the operator
to maintain insurance against third party liabilities regarding licensed activities. The type,
cover,  level  and  identity  of  the  insurer  need  the  approval  of  the  regulator  who  sets
guidelines on the minimum insurance requirements that the operators must meet. Operating
licensed activities without insurance approved by the regulator is considered a breach of the
license.
Finally,  the  fourth  element that  makes  service quality  regulation different  from
social quality regulation is related to externality issues and, in particular to those connected
with the environment (engine pollution, noise, transport of hazardous goods, etc.) Again, in
this  case, social quality  regulation should be  concerned  with  both  internal and  external
factors  of  the  rail  operators,  and  have  several  differences  and  similitudes  with  other
transport modes.
For example, air pollution is usually one of the most regulated areas with regard to
quality  regulation  in  road  and  air transport  modes.  In  the  rail  industry,  however,  air
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countries  or  routes.  Noise  pollution,  either  in  suburban neighborhoods,  areas  close to
stations,  depots  or  particularly  delicate  countryside  ecosystems  has  attracted  a  larger
attention both from the public and the regulators. Most countries, therefore, incorporate in
their  regulation the  design  and  specification  of  measures to  reduce  noise  produced by
rolling stock and stationary sources (fans, compressors, and generators) and shunting noise.
Two  final  related  issues  with  regard  to  environmental  regulation  are  the
measurement, analysis and prediction of emissions of chemical substances resulting from
the presence of railway lines (heavy metals, lubricants, dust, etc.), and the assessment of the
risks  to  the  safety of  local  residents  as  a  result  of  rail-related  activities  (transport  of
dangerous goods, explosions, etc.) In these cases, as in many other aspects, most countries
subordinate their  social quality  standards  and the role  of their  regulators  to the  overall
technical principles emanating from supranational organisms or professional associations.
Private and public rail transport operators are obliged to comply with the environmental
standards set at the national and supranational level. In Europe, for example, there are EC
Directives on air pollution from vehicles specifying the environmental standards authorized
to  vehicle  engines  and  fuel  qualities,  and  these  apply  to  both  vehicles  (wagons,
locomotives) and transport operations.
4.1.3.  - Dynamic  quality:  investments
According to Box 4.1, there exists a third dimension in the quality regulation of the rail
industry. Since the regulatory process is by itself a dynamic relationship between, on one
side, the regulator and, on the other, the regulated transport providers and the firms and
their passengers, the dynamic links of such a relationship must be taken into account when
certain quality  standards are to be controlled. In particular, the investment policy of the
railroads  is  the  most  important  dynamic  element  to  be  considered  in  the  design  of
concession  contracts  and,  in  particular,  with  respect  to  the  implications  that  these
investments will have on the future performance of the firns.  A complete quality regulation
regarding the investment policy must start by defining which part decides the investment
objectives, in terms of fleet and track renewal rates, track and station maintenance, or future
investment obligations, for example. When the regulator assumes this role, it must also set
up adequate mechanisms to monitor the progress of the investment stages, and provide the
incentives to avoid stopping projects before their conclusion.
When the regulated rail transport provider is in charge of its investment policy (with
respect to the renewal or maintenance of its fleet, for example) a quality control should also
be  imposed to avoid, for example, inadequate planning or excessive unnecessary repairs as
a means of earning extra  revenues from  subsidiary companies.  In some  countries, most
clearly in the United Kingdom, this control has been exerted by isolating non-commercial
investments and non-commercial aspects of overall investment planning, and making them
the subject of specific grants from public funds.
In all cases, one of the most controversial issues to be carefully discussed in the
concession contract is the relationship between this investment and the prices to be set to
- 37 -recover it, since ex ante prices are decisive in determining the extent and mix of investment
in  new  rail  infrastructure.  Uneconomic  investment  decisions  have,  historically,  been
imposed by governments on railways, and in most countries this has been the main cause of
accumulated debt. In fact, as described in Section 2, insulating railway operators from such
debts has been a central aim of the railway reform and restructuring processes carried out
around  the world.  Thus,  in principle,  the  simplest decision  rule, according  to  standard
economic  principles,  is  to  proceed  with  projects  whose  net  present  value,  calculated
according to a suitable discount rate, is positive. In theory, the most obvious discount rate
to use in public sector projects is the interest rate on long-term government bonds.
In practice, however, this bond rate may not be appropriate in several circumstances
and governments which choose a discount rate lower than this rate invariably find that they
cannot afford to proceed with all the projects with positive net present value. 20 This means
that, in certain cases, it is more useful to specify a hurdle rate (that determines whether the
project will in fact be implemented) and then test it against the project's  internal rate of
return. Therefore, on purely economic efficiency grounds, if this selective process is strictly
conducted and calculations are correct, only projects with non-generating losses on new
investments should proceed in order to avoid later problems with cost recovery in regard to
infrastructure pricing. However, on social grounds, few rail  investments would pass this
strict cost-benefit analysis, and subsidies to pay for the fixed costs may be required at the
investment point.
With regard to investment financing, the more important aspect to consider from the
point of view of quality regulation in the concession contract design, is the monitoring of
the  financial health  of  the  operator  so  as  to  prevent  possible  cheating  incentives  (for
example, lowering the quality  of building  materials  in tracks,  signaling mechanisms  or
stations). In principle, there are no specific criteria for rail investments according to which
the regulator  should impose particular rules  with respect to  the  firm's  capital structure.
When the size of the investment is large enough, it is the private concessionaire who will
seek the adequate mix between debt and equity that enables her to carry out the project.
Only if  there is the participation of the government  or  some public agency  in the new
investment, should the concession contract regulate the conditions and terms under which
the assets transfer (if any) takes place.
Alternatively, within a context  in which  the main (sometimes, unique) source  of
funding for the infrastructure provider is the revenue from track charges, different criteria
are to be used to reflect two basic circumstances:  where the aim is to maintain existing
standards, or to provide increased capacity and better quality of service. In the former case,
the regulated access charge is set to provide the cost of renewal as seen by the regulator.
The incentive for the infrastructure provider to undertake the investment is provided by the
performance regime.  Where expansion or improvement  of rail  capacity  is required, the
track manager is expected to finance such investments by means of increased revenues, so
that train operators and infrastructure providers should share both the risks and benefits of
an improved infrastructure.
20  See  for example  Layard  and  Glaister  (1994),  for a description  of standard  cost-benefit  analysis  procedures.
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negotiation  and  re-negotiation  rules  constitute  a  relevant  element  in  the  dynamic
relationship established between regulator and operators. A common situation, for example
in Argentina, is that once licenses have been awarded, rail operators use fake or real (but
possibly not required) quality investments to improve their position and demand changes in
their license conditions.
4.2. - Instruments for quality control in the rail industry.
Once the quality  objectives, in its service, social and dynarnic quality dimensions, have
been setup, the following step in any process of devising a system for regulating quality in
the railway industry concerns the design of the instruments for control. In principle, there
are three alternative mechanisms for regulating quality in the railways industry.
First, the firm could be required simply to publish measures of quality every pre-
defined period and to report this information to the regulator. This information can also be
made public to  inform consumers and/or  actual or potential  rivals about the operator's
current  performance.  As  in  any  other  type  of  regulation  process,  access  to  public
information is a very delicate issue since it can both serve as a disciplinary device for the
rail provider and a strategic instrument to undermine or strengthen the ability of the firm to
survive in the market.
A second mechanism to control quality consists of including a direct  and explicit
measure of quality in the price control mechanism. For example, when subject to rate of
return regulation, a rail service provider may be obliged to calculate its asset base according
to  certain average values and/or require  authorization to  carry out  certain technological
improvements in order to avoid overinvestment to make use of the Averch-Johnson effect.
Similarly, under price-cap restrictions, the basket of products whose average price increase
is controlled by the regulator can be suitability defined in order to avoid the changes in
quality  (and consequently,  cost reductions) that  could be  used by the regulated firm to
increase its profits, even if the same price caps are maintained.
The third mechanism that can be used to  control quality is the setup of customer
compensation schemes, through which grants or payments are awarded to those affected by
non-compliance with quality standards. In practice, however, these mechanisms only work
if quality failures can be easily verified. This requires a detailed regulation not only of the
quality standards, but also of the monitoring rules and the guarantees for the regulator and
the regulated that the inspection process will be transparent and objective. Moreover, if the
compensation is distributed to  the consumers,  either by the  firm directly or through  an
intermediary body, sharing rules must be also defined. The practical difficulties associated
with this quality control mechanism have made it common in many countries to  specify
instead the minimum quality standards for certain parameters of its rail industry, backing
them with explicit legal sanctions that may include fines or the revocation or withdrawal of
the license to operate.
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-41 -Finding the adequate mix of these control mechanisms often becomes the most difficult
task in the design of the quality regulation process. The approach followed by most countries in
their  railway  restructuring  process  can  be  outlined  in  Box  4.3,  where  the  most  important
instruments are summarized.
In conclusion, the quality regulation process comprises three stages. First, before entering
the market (Stage I), the aim should be to anticipate and minimize future conflicts between the
regulator  and  the  concessionaire  of  the  rail  service. 21 Licenses  must  specify  the  expected
characteristics  of  the  service  in  terms  of,  for  example, routes  and  frequencies  of  trains  or
timetables. For passenger  services, particularly in the case of urban or suburban trains, vehicle
capacities and punctuality can also be set. Finally, in order not to forget the dynamic dimension
of  quality  described  above, Stage I  must  also  specify investment plans  and  financing  rules.
Afterwards, during market operation (Stage II), instruments for quality control in the rail industry
should mostly be related to the direct monitoring of the firm's  performance. Thus, this is the time
to introduce incentives toward quality in price-mechanisms, to design the information revelation
obligations of the firm, and the auditing (external or internal) processes to be carried out. In most
cases, the use of instrument of technical control (such as tacographs or track electronic controls)
complements the standard instruments. Finally, after the transport activity has already occurred
(Stage III), compensations or punishments can be implemented. Several schemes, as described
above, can be used. In any case, both penalties and incentives must be graded according to the
expected future evolution of the relationship, since severe fines or large subsidies may alter the
standard behavior of the operator in the market.
5. - THE ROLE OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURES.
The  separation  of  infrastructure from  operational  services  in  railways  constitutes  a  relevant
feature  in this  sector, conditioning the  concessioning process in  many countries. The vertical
unbundling process, aimed at solving the natural monopoly issue described in Section 1, cannot
only promote greater allocative efficiency, but also encourage some other questions of relevance
for  regulation.  These  questions  become  particularly  important  when  the  degree  of  private
participation in rail infrastructure management is relevant. In this case, the economic regulation
of infrastructure should be  governed by the adequate combination of three standard principles:
fair access to the infrastructure, cost recovery, and efficient access pricing.
5.1. - Access to rail infrastructures.
Regulation of rail infrastructure does not only include simple pricing principles, but also access
rights  and  long-termn  development  provisions.  The  form  in  which  these  subjects  have been
addressed varies among countries. Most governments have opted to retain infrastructure in public
ownership with  the  creation of  a  State  agency  to  manage  it  (the first  example  is  Sweden's
Banverket) with respect to private train operators (as in Argentina); others (such as France and
Germany) have established independent State-owned enterprises to manage railtracks. Only the
United Kingdom has privatized both infrastructure and operations.
21 To achieve  this,  pre-tender  qualification  requirements  can be used in order to ensure  a minimum  level of technical
and practical  expertise  and financial  solvency,  as described  in previous  section.
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railways  industry  should  first  start  by  including  minimum  investment  requirements  to
counterbalance short-term myopia where infrastructure has been privatized, in order to  ensure
that key investments are not subordinated to the private goals of augmenting annual dividends or
defending the firm from potential hostile takeovers.
Secondly, the regulation must tackle the issue of access, which is particularly relevant in
the case  of highly  integrated trans-national  networks  (as in  Europe)  or privately or  publicly
managed dense networks (as in the United States, Canada and  some countries in Asia). In the
European Union, for example, Directive 91/440 directs each member State to grant international
access  and  transit  rights  to  international  groupings  in  which  stakes  are  held  by  railway
undertakings in that or other member States. There have been no directives or resolutions related
to  domestic  traffic,  although the  European  Commission  has  advocated that  these provisions
should be extended  to  all freight  and international passenger  services. Most countries simply
charge their (still monopolistic) train operators for the use of the (also public) rail infrastructure.
In the wholly privatized structure of the United Kingdom, open access has been limited
for passenger services by a number of provisions regarding moderating excessive competition.
These provisions were initially designed to provide protection to rail franchisees both from new
entrants and from each other, and it is anticipated that they will be gradually reduced over time.
In other countries, access rights are also clearly specified in the contract, as mentioned in Section
3. For example, in Argentina the concessionaires have exclusive use of the tracks, but must grant
access  to  passenger  operations  in  return  for  a  compensatory  track  fee.  In  the  Abidjan-
Ouagadougou rail  link  between  C6te d'Ivoire  and  Burkina Faso,  after  the initial  seven-year
exclusivity period the current operator will have to grant track access, for an agreed fee to any
third party carrier approved by the regulator (Mitchell and Budin, 1997). In certain large cities,
like Mexico,  D.F.  or Buenos Aires,  the  operators  share  a  common  network  under  a  unique
transport authority.
The  final aspect  regarding  access  rights  to  rail  infrastructures  lies in  the removal  of
existing  or  potential  barriers  to  entry  that  might  distort  competition  by  favoring  certain
competitors against others. These barriers should also include technical requirements (related, for
example, to incompatible rolling stocks and tracks) and safety standards (in terms of the common
minimum  level to  be  attained by  all  operators).  In  summary, the  general  rule  should be  to
promote open access as widely as possible, once the separation between the natural monopoly
infrastructure  and  the train  operations  has  been  effectively  achieved.  However,  this  process
cannot  be made  independent of a  detailed  analysis of the  infrastructure costs  and the prices
charged for covering them.
5.2. - The problem of rail infrastructure costs.
As described in Section 1, rail infrastructure provision and management are characterized by a
high  ratio  of fixed to  marginal costs, the  existence  of avoidable costs  and  non-avoidable or
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not produced, no cost would be incurred. The use of this guiding principle relates to the idea of
cost  recovery  for  particular  outputs.  Avoidable  costs  may  thus  be  considered  as  a  floor  to
regulated prices (if any), since charging less than the avoidable cost is equivalent to operating at
an economic loss. This makes standard pricing rules inoperable in this sector, since first best or
efficient  principles  of  marginal cost  pricing  may  derive  in  large  deficits  that jeopardize  the
survival of the firm in  the long run. Three particular problems then arise with  respect to  the
allocation of the rail infrastructure costs: cross-subsidization issues, cost-recovery problems, and
the possibility of setting inefficient prices for infrastructures (Talley, 1988).
The existence of cross-subsidization problems in pricing rail services or infrastructures
produced in the presence  of common costs, can be illustrated in the case of a profit-regulated
railroad  which interconnects two large cities  and  also provides rail  service to  a smaller  town
located on the route between the two cities. The fares charged for passage from the small town
are sufficient to generate revenues in excess of the additional costs of serving it, such as ticketing
and station costs, but not sufficient to cover an equal or proportionate (however defined) share of
the common costs, such as trackage,,  signaling, and trainyard costs. The issue is how to allocate
common costs among customers and services. In many cases, cost sub-additivity also, and then
efficiency requires joint  production and  allocation  of  fixed costs among all services, without
cross-subsidization (accounting for externalities whenever present).
Cross subsidization is not only an equity problem for rail services, as in this example, but
also a particularly relevant issue for efficient pricing in  infrastructures like railbeds, signals or
stations. The standard procedure is the  so-called  fully distributed costs  method, under  which
common costs are allocated on the basis of some common measure of utilization, such as gross
tons-km, or other measure of relative output or gross revenue. Alternatively, common costs can
also  be  allocated in  proportion to  costs that  can be  directly assigned to  the  various  services
(Braeutigam,  1980). The  arbitrary  nature  of  fully  distributed  cost  methods  and  its  lack  of
conceptual foundations have been criticized, but  they remain  a useful  measure for recovering
common costs.
However,  the  treatment  of  the  cross-subsidization  problem  should  not  be  based  on
excessively  rigid  criteria,  particularly  for  developing  countries  with  few  alternative  finance
mechanisms. The analysis should be made on a case-by-case basis, since, for examiple, stand-
alone cost test do not apply if railroads are not allowed to abandon unremunerative facilities or
services (Kessides  and  Willig,  1995). Where that  freedom  is  denied, a  railroad  cannot  earn
adequate revenues if its rates on potentially remunerative activities are constrained by stand-alone
cost ceilings.
With regard to the cost recovery principle, this should be a central issue in the design of
any rail infrastructure pricing procedure. The theoretical and political debate has focused on two
options. On one hand, many public firms still advocate the use of efficient price mechanisms (in
the sense described in Section 3) and propose marginal cost rules with the simultaneous use of
public subsidies to cover fixed costs.
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including  price discrimination, multiple  part tariffs or cross-subsidization  schemes, if needed.
Although  it is reckoned that it might yield inefficient outcomes with regard to  the theoretical
efficiency principles, they constitute the second best available alternative in most cases.
Similarly, with respect to access pricing to a rail network, it is clear that it should be based
on marginal cost pricing rules in a first best world. In practice, however, the achievement of this
objective is difficult due to at least three reasons: the above described cost structure of the rail
network, which cannot always be recovered with simple price rules; the asymmetric information
problem  faced by the regulator with respect  to these costs; and  the subsidy level that  can be
sustainable in the long-run.
Many econometric studies have shown that in the case of the rail industry, the marginal
cost of still vertically integrated railways lies in the range of 60%-70% of average cost; where rail
services are separated from  infrastructure, the marginal social cost of rail  infrastructure alone
often is  well  below  the  60%-70% range.  (Friedlander  et al.,  1993). Price discrimination,  if
feasible and politically acceptable, might succeed in raising cost recovery to around 60% of total
cost without driving demand off the market.  Thus, full cost recovery would require a  further
price-mark-up of more than 60% above the efficient price. Alternative proposals, in terms of the
so-called Ramsey pricing principle, have been defended for infrastructures with high fixed costs
and low marginal costs. 2 However, they rarely work in practice, since they arouse consumers'
suspicions of unfair treatment and undue discrimination. Moreover, under Ramsey pricing rules
all unattributable fixed and common costs are apportioned on the basis of the services'  demand
characteristics.
In the current debate, a reasonable  conclusion seems to advocate the adequate balance
between the cost recovery issue and the efficient pricing rules, giving some preferential treatment
to each one according to the case. In general, the issue remains unsolved and depends on how
different countries have faced their access pricing problem. Whether a country's  government is
willing to assume these differences or not is, in most cases, a political question. In many cases,
the ultimate challenge is how to price access to rail infrastructure in a transparent, efficient and
non-discriminatory  way.  In  Europe,  for  example,  Directive  95/19  requires  infrastructure
managers to balance revenues with expenditures. In countries where revenues from operations
and compensation from government for public service obligations  are insufficient to provide a
surplus for  depreciation  and investment,  railways will be  dependent  on  the State to  fund  or
guarantee repayment on  loans for  investment. This  continues  to  be  the case in  many of the
countries of central and Eastern Europe.
5.3. - The access pricing problem.
The  development  of  tariffs  for  accessing  rail  infrastructure  varies  greatly  among  different
22  Ramsey pricing refers to charging larger prices above unit costs to more inelastic market segments.  When
infrastructure  and services are separated,  their use becomes  more complicated  and still is not clearly solved,  since
different  demands  for services  - as well as for tracks - must be estimated.
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already identified procedures for setting fees, and a number of them have laid down precise rules
for the structure and level of fees. In others, business unit or infrastructure companies (either in
public or private hands) are responsible for setting charges. In fact, access charges are mostly
relevant in countries where traditional railroads have been vertically unbundled by the separation
of the potentially competitive area of service operations from the naturally monopolistic area of
infrastructure management.
Apart from the already discussed problem of cost recovery, access pricing may create a
market structure problem regarding its effects on competition and barriers to entry. This problem
arises in network industries where a single vertically integrated dominant firm (either private or
public) controls the supply of a key input (in this case, railway tracks) to its competitors. It is
obvious that in these cases, there are incentives for the firm to set prices high to  raise rivals'
costs, but it could also be the case in which the regulator sets access prices too low in order to
favor the entrants.
In practice, these potentially distortionary effects on access prices can be determined in
several  ways,  depending  on  the  discretion  allowed  to  the  integrated  firm.  First,  when  the
infrastructure is still publicly  owned or managed, the regulator  can determine the price as an
integrating part  of the  access terms  defined  in  a  contract with  one  of  several  private  train
operators. Secondly, the  regulator may allow  the firm to  choose  from a  menu  of alternative
regulative schemes, usually based on incentive-based price regulation mechanisms (in order to
favor the firm achieving higher levels of efficiency). Thirdly, the firm may have discretion over
aspects of access pricing subject to some overall regulatory constraint, and finally, the firm may
have full discretion over the price and is only restricted by the provisions of the antitrust law of
the country.
In any of these cases, there are two main approaches to setting-up access pricing when the
principles of cost recovery plus the normal rate of return are required. First, there are countries
that use cost-related charges, which constitutes the current dominant paradigm for setting access
charges. These charges  are based  on the  optimal  first-best principle  of  pricing  according to
marginal cost, which is considered the forward-looking long-run incremental cost.
This principle becomes more complex the higher the proportion of common costs, and is
based on the so-called efficient-component rule, which determines that the optimal access charge
should be equal to the  direct cost of providing  access plus the opportunity  cost  of providing
access  (given by  the  reduction  in  the  dominant  firm's  profit).  To  compute  these  costs  the
regulator  will  also  have  to  consider  economic  depreciation  (physical  depreciation  plus
technological progress), and forecast the likely future usage of the elements.
The first problem to be solved is that of the actual value of capital assets: nominal value
versus potential to generate cash. While the latter is clearly a function of selected methods of
privatization  and regulation,  and the  extent  of competition  envisaged to  bid  for the right  of
operating concessioned infrastructure services, the former option is more likely to reflect a past
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The second method of setting access prices consists in developing usage-related charges.
Once  avoidable costs  are covered  in  increasing prices  inversely related to  demand elasticity.
Another option (a less controversial approach, particularly if it is optional) is the use of a two part
tariff to avoid train operators cutting services to save charges even when there is no cost saving in
the network.
The  case  of  the  British  infrastructure  provider,  Railtrack,  constitutes  a  well-studied
example of the functioning of access prices in practice. The main targets in the constitution and
privatization of this firm were set to obtain a better organization of transport services, reduced
costs and a higher efficiency. In a context where operating companies have also been franchised,
Railtrack manages the infrastructure (that is track, signaling systems, electric power supply and
stations) and is responsible for its maintenance, new investments and train operations (timetables,
coordination, etc.). It also sells access to infrastructure to the (passenger) operating companies
and to the freight operators.
Railtrack owns the rail network and set track charges that have to be agreed upon with the
rail  regulator  under  the  criteria  openly  published  through  a  number  of  regulatory  policy
statements. The price control system operates through a simple RPI-X formula, which is revised
every five years  and remains fixed until the next revision. For example, in January  1995 the
regulator announced the price controls that would apply to franchised passenger services from
April 1995 to April 2001.
The structure of Railtrack's access charges for franchised passenger services is based on
the principle of usage-related charges and, in particular, are made of multiple part tariffs, with at
least  four  elements. 23 First,  track  usage  charges,  which  tend  to  reflect  short  run  effects  on
maintenance and the renewal costs of running trains of different  types for different distances.
Second,  traction  current  charges,  which  recover  the  costs  of  electric  current,  varying
geographically and temporally and  reflecting distance covered and type of vehicle. Third, the
long run incremental cost, which indicates the long run costs imposed on Railtrack in delivering
the total access rights of a train operator; and finally, the apportionment of common costs, which
is a remainder of the fixed charge designed to recover the rest of Railtrack's  costs at the sub-
zonal, zonal or national level. This is apportioned among train operators on the basis of budgeted
passenger  vehicle  miles  for  sub-zonal costs  and  budgeted  passenger  revenue  for  zonal  and
national costs. Whereas the first two elements amount on average to only some 9% of total track
access charges, and given the current structure of charges, only these elements vary directly with
use. The remaining 91% of the aggregate charge is in the form of a fixed charge, which does not
vary with the number or type of train runs, or with passenger revenue.
In the case of freight  services, access prices  are more  flexible. The rail  regulator has
simply established several principles to be considered by Railtrack in its relationship with private
operators. First, the prices must cover the avoidable costs incurred by Railtrack as a direct result
23 See Dodgson  (1994)  and ORR  (1997)  for a detailed  description  of the British  system.
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cost, which would be incurred by a notional efficient competitor; third, no undue discriminatory
charges are possible; and finally, the structure of charges should reflect the value to  users of
access to the rail network, and enable Railtrack recover its total cost
As opposed to the British case, the setting of access charges in other European countries is
still  underdeveloped.  In  1995,  the  European  Union  passed  two  directives  concerning  the
application  of  Directive  91/440  on  the  separation  between  infrastructure  management  from
transport operations. Directive 95/18 regulated the licensing of railway undertakings, whereas
Directive 95/19 established several general principles on the allocation of railway infrastructure
capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees. These principles were  designed to  ensure  an
optimum and non-discriminatory use of infrastructure and guarantee an access charging policy
according to  EC  rules, but  Member States received these  Directives with  various  degrees of
enthusiasm. The objective of most governments that have set rules for infrastructure fees is to
cover costs, differentiating fees to reflect such factors as type of service, wear on track, distance
of run, routing, etc.
In  France,  for example,  several  principles  were  introduced to  give  access to  railway
infrastructure for licensed international groupings of transport services and operators of combined
transport,  but  present  arrangements  seem  keener  to  promote  conventional  rail  international
groupings rather than new entrants in the rail market. With centrally planned timetables, the only
domestic operator pays a fixed amount to the (also public) infrastructure manager. User fees are
fixed taking into account a wide set of criteria, including infrastructure costs, the transport market
situation and characteristics of supply and  demand, imperatives based  on optimized use of the
national rail network, and the standardization of conditions for intermodal competition.
Similarly,  in  Germany, the Federal  Government  owns  the  track  infrastructure  and  is
responsible for its preservation and for securing a certain level of service in public transport by
means of the Deutsche Bahn (DB), an independent joint stock holding whose sole shareholder is
the State. The infrastructure division of DB bears the costs for operating  and maintaining rail
infrastructure, and it is also in charge of stations, sale of tickets, passenger attention, etc. It is also
responsible  for  setting  charges  for  the  use  of  the  track,  which  are  supposed  to  cover  all
infrastructure costs, including investment. These charges are based on prices per train-km on the
different  line  sectors,  which  results  in  a  considerable number  of  different  fee  combinations
(Hafner, 1996).
5.4. - Coordination and intermodal competition.
A final relevant issue when considering rail infrastructures and its pricing is the topic of inter-
modal competition. As it was mentioned in Section 1, modal choices could be heavily distorted
due to different cost coverage ratios and the use of different bases for cost imputation. 24 To solve
this problem an integrated, multi-modal, approach should be followed. Basic principles will have
24 In fact, one of the reasons  mentioned  in Section  2 to explain  the decline  of the rail industry  was the fact that road
transport  did not internalize  its social  costs  (in terms of pollution  or safety,  for example).
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countries like Argentina or Chile, the extent-of road freight transport competition was considered
in  designing the  rail  concession  contracts.  The  general  rule  was- that  operators undertaking
business  at  their  own  commercial  and  financial  risk  should  not  find  themselves  unduly
disadvantaged by competitors who enjoy public aids or indirectly benefit from huge externalities.
In the case of natural monopoly infrastructures, the principles envisaged to avoid these
distortionary  effects  should  be  solidified  in  the  coordination  between  existing  networks
(particularly, in dense rail areas) and the setup of mechanisms that facilitate inter-operability and
international links. On this  score, neither the most advanced infrastructure regulations, such as
the  Swedish or the British  systems offer much help,  since their  were  conceived for a  single
country  environment. In  other countries,  such  as Argentina  before  the restructuring  process,
railways were directed to  solve national transport problems (in terms of  offering underpriced
passenger  services  or  subsidized  low  quality  freight  transport).  As  a  result,  their  financial
performance rapidly deteriorated in an isolated framework. Therefore, the infrastructure pricing
strategy in these areas should be compatible with the achievement of both local and international
objectives, by establishing, if needed, a system of slots assignment on more congested corridors.
In summary, the main conclusion of this section is that the control of track access, pricing
and  development  of  infrastructure  is  an  inevitable  part  of  any  rail  industry  where  vertical
unbundling and a notable  degree of  private participation in  train  services provision  has been
achieved. In these cases, the ultimate goal of regulation should be to  ensure that  infrastructure
access and its pricing promote an efficient structure of production, use and consumption of the
transport services, while allowing network providers to make a sufficient return.
6. - PERFORMANCE INDICATORS IN THE RAIL INDUSTRY.
6.1. - The use of performance indicators in the rail industry.
Performance indicators  in the rail  industry  are used  to monitor  the behavior of  one  or more
regulated  firms  in  order  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  regulatory  measures  they  are
subjected to. 25 The main advantage of these indicators or indices is that they provide a periodical
assessment and control of the firm's  activity, and a system of continuously updating information,
that is simple, quickly obtained, and has a relative low administrative cost for the regulator.
Their most important disadvantage is that their use is only valid when comparisons, either
between different firms  or the same firm over time,  are constructed  on  a similar  basis.  For
example, when inter-firm comparisons are to be made, the companies must belong to countries
with similar characteristics (e.g. in the participation of transport in the economy as a whole, the
degree  of  economic  development,  or  the  regulatory  framework,  etc.),  whereas  if  intra-firm
comparisons are intended, the indicators must account for external and internal changes produced
during each period (e.g. new management, changes in demand, etc.)
25 For example,  quality  indicators,  in the sense defined in Section  5, can be established  in a contract and reviewed
regularly  to confirm  that the terms of the license  are being fulfilled.
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that can serve the regulator in setting their objectives and designing future license contracts.
However, extreme care should be used in drawing normative conclusions  from these results.
What constitutes  a benchmark  of desirable practice for some objectives  may be different  among
companies.  For example,  countries  with very liberalized  frameworks  in their rail industry  (as the
United States, for example)  could set levels of desirable practice for productivity  indicators  (or
quality of service) that clearly differ from the levels in other more regulated frameworks (as
Europe).
Similarly,  simple indicators should be carefully interpreted over time to avoid incurring
contradictions  and inappropriate  measurements.  For example,  when assessing  railway output,  the
number of train-km might be a relatively high number, while the number of passenger-km  or
tons-km  may be relatively  low (if the firmn  specializes  in one type of traffic). Given  this conflict,
the notion of overall performnance  can be ambiguous and the most practical solution is a joint
interpretation  of the indicators  and the objectives  that they serve. For example,  a service  quality
objective,  such as the number  of trains per hour, may conflict  with financial  objectives,  reflected
in the high cost recovery  rate, or with objectives  based on the maintenance  of low  prices.
Thompson and Fraser (1996) point out that both monetary and productivity  variables
should be carefully defined when attempting  inter-firm  comparisons.  Fares, wages, outputs and
inputs  widely vary among countries  for a large number of reasons  that are sometimes  not related
to the firm's operations,  but to measurement  or statistical  errors.  For example,  average  passenger
fares are based on the overall mix of passenger classes (with different prices each). Tariffs are
often higher per passenger-km  for short trips than for long ones, and they must also depend on
the existence  of government  subsidies  or artificial  compensations.  Similarly,  common  mistakes  in
the case of freight tariffs include not taking into account  the different commodity mix, size of
shipment  or length  of haul. This latter effect, which also affects  passenger traffic, is particularly
relevant,  since some  costs (ticketing,  billing, or station maintenance,  for example)  are fixed with
respect  to the length  of the trip but vary with size or distance.
These difficulties  are even increased  in the case of measuring  productivity,  since a simple
comparison  among  partial measurements  of output cannot  capture  the complexity  of relationships
or the variety of productive structures that take place within a rail operator. For example, a
commonly used productivity  indicator, such as the number of passengers-km  or tons-km per
employee, 26 depends  on such diverse  factors (e.g., regulatory  environment,  structure  of the labor
market, availability  and quality of infrastructure,  alternative  transport modes, etc.), that it could
be seriously  misleading  if interpreted  without  care.
To elude these sorts of problems,  the construction  of performance  indicators  should  avoid
excessively  simple data management,  and use statistical techniques that take into account the
differences in the relative environments  faced by  each company. Oum and Yu (1994), for
example,  estimated  different efficiency  levels for a sample of railway companies  of the OECD,
by introducing internal factors (such as  the characteristics  of  outputs) and external factors
26 The term employee can also refer to terminal staff, administrative staff, train crew or maintenance staff. Similarly,
capital can be disaggregated into trains, wagons, terminals, platforms, routes, etc.
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6.2. - Main types of indicators in the railways industry.
Despite these difficulties, a large number of indicators are commonly used nowadays to monitor
the performance  of  firms  within  the  rail  industry  around  the  world.  The  definition of  each
particular indicator depends on the objective it must achieve and its informative value.
Box 6.1. Contextual indicators in the rail industry.
railc  tereni  act  seea  xea  atr,  hc  aywdl  rm  onr  ocutyo
conexua  ind00icators, arei  required  Cd  to;-Xi-S.,,  assis  thi  S  ompartAive  analysis  andR  to  define  desirablem
leverof  permtofrmance.  these  suandicat  incluene thei  socimalrisdeonomic  firstctyperfisicsacto
railway sector as well as other elements associated with the economy as a whole, and are mainly
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intra-firn  comparisons.  Box  6.1 presents  several  examples  that  could be -obtained relatively
easily from international statistical sources. 27
Box 6.2. Management indicators in the rail industry.
_  Prices
Average  passenger  fare  (revenues  per  passenger-km)
Average  freight  price  (revenues  per  ton-kxn)
.*  ality  oservice
2 S
Average  train-speed  (in passengers  and  freight)
Delayed  arrivals  or depatures  (as  % of scheduled)
Commercial  % of lost  or  damaged  freight
Average  passenger  load  factor
Traffic  density  (trains  per hour)
*  Pollution  and  safety
Rate  of fuel  usage  (per  train-kin)
Level  of  noise
Level  of emission  of pollutants
Number  of accidents  or incidents
* Labr  ~produc~tivity
Passengers-km  per-employee Tons-km  per empoe
Passenr  train-km  per,employee
Freight  trains-km  per  employee
Operational  Total  trains-km  per  emploeee
*CapiWa  productiit
Number  i  kms.  traveled  by locomotives
Locomotive  availability  (in °)
Tons-km  per wagon-km
Wagons-km  per  wagon
Tonskm  per wagon
Efficiency
Costs  per  employee.-
I  .. Costs  per unit  of capital




Simultaneously, there are many indicators (particularly, those about prices and quality of
service) that  are both  informative to  transport  users  and constitute  inputs  for the  regulator's
control tasks. Jointly with the contextual indicators, these management  indicators provide the
necessary instruments to judge the management  and the behavior of the company, and can be
grouped at three different levels, as summarized in the examples in Box 6.2. These boxes only
provide indicative examples of possible performance indicators for the most relevant categories
27 In particular,  the International  Union  of Railways  (UIC)  publishes  a yearly  summary  of the main  statistics  of its
affiliated  railways,  although  not  all  of them  are  always  available  for  all  railroads.
28 See  also  Section  5.
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previous sections of this paper, where a number of private companies are potentially  franchise
operators in the rail industry, the regulatory agency should define those indicators that best suit
its information needs.
Some final practical rules that could be helpful in this process are the following ones: (i)
each indicator should have at least a function  or objective, (ii) the relationship between each
indicator and its  objective must  be clear  and  direct,  although  (iii) multiple objectives can be
addressed by multiple indicators (jointly interpreted); finally, in order to assure the utility of the
indicators,  (iv)  appropriate  data  must  be  provided,  and  (v) the  management  of  indicators'
information should be part of the regulatory process.
Despite  the  difficulties  mentioned, price  indicators  can constitute  for  the regulator  a
mechanism of control over the activities  of the operators. This control may be established not
only  in  terms  of  the  comparison  between  companies  of  similar  characteristics, but  through
monitoring over  a period. In  any event, the regulator  must  ensure that  any variation in price
corresponds  to  a  proportionate  variation  in  companies'  costs  or  level  of  efficiency.  The
operational and efficiency indices are therefore instruments which help the tasks of the regulator.
Improvements in companies' productivity and efficiency levels combined with increases in price
levels are clear signs of abuse of market power on the part of railway operators.
Indicators of service quality were developed in Section 5, and they should serve, as price
indices, to establish evaluations of different companies, as well as dynamic or time evaluations.
These measurements should be analyzed together with price indices, because of the possibility of
finding different feasible combinations of price and service quality. For example, a high number
of trains per hour, i.e. a high traffic density, could only be financed by means of high prices.
The simultaneous implantation of systems of control for prices and service quality may
limit the management of the companies and reduce their operativity. Placing the emphasis on the
control of prices or of service quality depends fundamentally on whether it i prefers to offer the
service at the lowest price possible, or to offer the service with certain standards of quality. All
these indicators allow the regulator to monitor the activities of the operators as defined in Phase
II of Box 4.3.  Unjustified or a systematic breach of the standards of quality (insufficient number
of trains per hour, problems of punctuality and reliability of the service, very high indices of load
factor, etc) should be accompanied by an appropriate system of penalties, as described in Section
5.
6.3. - Best practices in the rail industry.
Taking into account the comparison caveats made above, the final part of this section compares
some  of  the most  relevant  performance  indicators  for  the  rail  industry  with  those  from  the
companies that obtain the best results, or at least with indices that one could consider desirable.
This  procedure,  commonly  used  by  many  governments  around  the  world  as  a  yardstick
mechanism, is exemplified in Box 6.3.  The last two columns show the values of the best practice
levels  for  a  sample  of  European,  Australian  and  American  rail  companies,  and  the  values
considered desirable according to  a World Bank  study by Gannon and Shalizi (1995) and the
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Box 6.3. Best practices in railways management indicators. Examples.
Revenues  and prices
Passengr  revenut passenger-km  (in US$)  E0.036  0.04
Freight  revenue/  ton-ki (in US$)  0. 19  0.03
-.  Freightto  passenger  tarif  atio  (%f)  - ; 
. ~~Commercial  services:>generaI 
A  hverage train  speed  (in  km/h)  ;-  60-90
.rrivals with  small  delays  (among  10-S15  mm.)  (in  %)  96  90-95
Commercial  Ratio  of lost  plus  damaged  freight  (in %)  1
indicators:  Commeial services:  passengers
Number  of passegers  per train.  -97.5  -
Passengers-km.  per  route-Ia (total)  5237  .
-(ifthousds per kin)  (136)  -
Commercial  services:  freight
N-mber  oftons  pertrain.  604-13
Tons-kin  per  route-km  (total)  -2819.19.  >2000
. (in  tousands  per k3  -)  (352)  -
Labor productivitg
Passengers-km  per  employee
Tons-km  per  emploee (in thousands)  11000  >750
Pass.  tain-km  per  employee.
..reigt  rain-km  per  employee.  .
Operlational Total  train-kan.  per employee  434.84
indicators  Cpia  prdutivity  .. 
Availility of tocomotives  (in  .)  - . >0%
Ton-km  perwagon  914.28 
Wagon-lm.  per  wagon
___________  Freight  and passeger wagons  availability  (in 1')  >90%.
Cost coverage
Financial  costs  covered  with total revenue  (in 0O/)  - >100
indicators  Costs  covered  with  typical  revenue  (in %)  . >80
Cost  reduction  required  to reach  break-even  (in %)  ,  <0
Source:  Gannon  and Shalizi  (1995)  and BIE (1995).  Desirable  values  are only approximate  and should be taken as general  references  that
might  vary  across  countries  and regions.
One of the most useful insights that can be provided by examples like those in Box 6.3 is
to make it clear that setting desirable values for indicators is a difficult task. Extreme care should
be put into making exclusionary comparisons. For example, according to figures, the unit revenue
ratio has a desirable value lower than 4 US$ cents (in passenger traffic) or 3US$ cent:s  in freight.
Lower values, as those achieved in several European countries (3.6 and  1.9, respectively) could
be  indicative of lower prices, or little fare collecting efficiency. In any case, the regulation in
force in each country will notably affect the levels of prices charged by each company.
With  regard  to  average  train  speed,  this  measurement  should  distinguish  between
passenger  and  freight  transport,  and  among  their  different  categories  (urban,  regional,  long
29  The  BIE  publishes  every  year  a benchmarking  report  (see BIE, 1995,  for example)  in which  their  main  utilities
(including rail transport) are compared worldwide.
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but in each country it should depend on the type of traffic, on the social and economic level of
each country, and the relative importance of the railways in its development.
Similarly, the  measurement of the average passenger  load, in  terms of the number of
passengers per  train,  is influenced by  the different  regulatory policies  in force, and  by other
variables such as the size of vehicles and the type of journey. In the case of Europe, the highest
level for the year 1994 was attained by the Italian national company, with an average of 197.5
passengers per train over the year. Correspondingly, the highest level of passenger traffic density
was also attained by an European railway,  5237 thousand passenger-kms  per route-km, by the
Dutch operator. In the case of freight traffic, the equivalent figures were 604 tons per train, for
the Finnish national operator, and 2819 thousand tons-kms per route-km by the corresponding
Belgian company.
With  respect  to  the  measurement  of  productivity,  it  is  often  grouped  around  the
productivity indices of labor and capital, as mentioned above. However, since many companies
do not detail the volume of employees by activities, often only the aggregate index of total train-
kms per employee is usually available. Previous studies (Nash, 1985) have estimated that freight
traffic is more labor-intensive than passenger traffic, so this measurement is clearly biased due to
the different composition of the output of railway companies. Considering the aggregate index
indicative  of the volume  of train-kms per  employee in  the case of Europe, the most  efficient
company in  1994 was the Dutch operator with a volume of 4434 train-kms per worker. In the
case of North America, where many companies offer only freight transport, the most efficient
companies transported about eleven million tons-km per employee.
Measurements relating to the productivity of capital can be divided into those that refer to
traction units or locomotives, or to wagons. With regard to locomotives, an interesting index is
the  locomotive  availability  (in  %),  which  indicates  the  degree  of  overdue  and  deferred
maintenance and for which Gannon and Shalizi (1995) recommend a value not less than 80%.
Finally,  the  financial  indicators  should  not  be  considered  of  lesser  importance  by  a
regulator,  even  if  it  is  more  concerned  with  operational  and  commercial  performance.  For
example, the ratio of revenues over total costs may indicate the company's degree of financial
solvency, whereas the level of subsidization, and subsidies as a percentage of total revenue or
costs, in turn indicates the degree of financial dependence on public bodies. These indicators are
very important and should not be independently interpreted since, as shown in Section 2 and by
the empirical evidence (see Gathon and Pestieau, 1995, for example) the most heavily subsidized
railway companies are often the most inefficient ones.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this section is that performance indicators, despite
being  very  useful,  should  be  designed  and  interpreted  with  care.  Reference  levels  and
comparisons must only  be treated as provisional  guides  and not  given firm normative status.
Individual indicators must not be analyzed in isolation from others. There is not a unique optimal
level for a single indicator, nor is there an optimal profile for several. An appropriate appraisal
requires tradeoffs measuring the relative cost of changing levels of different indicators and the
relative importance of the objectives that the indicators reflect.
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7.1. - Some issues in the design  of a regulatory  agency for the rail industry.
The design of regulatory institutions for the rail industry encompasses several issues relating to
such a broad number of matters that they are difficult to summarize. According to the incentive
literature (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), this subsection proposes a list of four key items that should
be considered, at least, at the beginning of such regulatory design: the degree of independence of
the regulatory  agency; its  relationship with  the government; the scope  and jurisdiction  of the
regulator; and the number of regulators and its appointment.
7.  1.  1. - The degree of independence of the regulatory agency.
Given the extensive experience of national railways around the world, the independence debate
should be the first and most defining issue to deal with in the design of a regulatory agency in the
rail industry. In a broad sense, the term "independence" pertains to the relationship among the
regulator  and  political  authorities,  regulated  firms,  consumers,  and  other  private  interests.
However,  this  simple  definition  conveys  a  common  misunderstanding  that  may  shed  some
confusion on its real significance, since no regulatory entity can be truly independent. Even if a
regulatory entity is a non-ministerial commission, it is still a body created by the government.
Thus,  independence just  means that the  regulator  does  not  have to  get the  approval  of any
political  body  in  its  activity  (Tenenbaum,  1996). In  the  case  of  rail  regulation, only  a  few
countries have fully independent agencies (as in the case of the United Kingdom), whereas in
most of them, railways are still considered in some sense a strategic sector.
7.1.2. - The relationship of the regulatory agency with the government.
The degree of discretion or autonomy in regulatory processes differs widely among countries and
industries,  according  to  their  particular  features.  Most  systems  lie  somewhere between  the
extreme case of broad discretion (where the laws only define "just and reasonable" behavioral
standards)  and  the  case of  tightly  specified  laws  or  almost-complete  contracts  between  the
regulatory body and the government, as in some European countries and New Zealand.
An important aspect to consider, with particular importance to developing countries, is the
overall political and social stability of the country, and the historical reputation for respecting
private property rights as a function of the development of its legal system. In fact, the higher a
country scores on these criteria, the more discretion its regulators can retain without significantly
increasing  the  risk  premium  of  the  cost  of  capital  demanded  by  investors  in  their  rail  or
infrastructure services.
In  any  case,  to  be  autonomous,  rail  regulatory  agencies  must  first  have  their  own
resources, since purely relying on government or budgetary transfers controlled by politicians, is
a  threat  not  only  to  their  autonomy  and  effectiveness,  but,  more  dangerously,  to  their
independence. The most common method of funding is through levies on the regulated firms or
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levies can be viewed as user fees for the coordination services provided by the.  regulator.
7.1.3 - The scope and jurisdiction of the regulator.
In principle, rail regulatory authorities  are usually industry-specific, co-existing with  separate
agencies for each of the most important utilities, as in the United Kingdom. However, they could
also be sector-specific, with separate agencies for groups of related industries, or multisectoral,
with a single regulatory agency for all or most infrastructure sectors.
Although the choice of a particular regulatory scope has not followed a single method in
most  countries,  it  is  agreed  that  a  multisectoral  agency  offers  some  advantages  over  its
alternatives,  particularly  in  countries  with  limited  regulatory  capacity.  In  fact,  a  transport
authority  (either at the national  level  or for particular  areas or cities)  would  pool regulatory
resources  and  tend  to  increase  resistance  to  regulatory  capture  or  political  interference.
Simultaneously, multisectoral regulation improves the consistency of decisions across sectors and
reduces the risk of economic distortions and allows dealing with blurred industry boundaries (like
in the case of urban transport).
On the side  of the  disadvantages,  advocates  of  industry-specific agencies  for  the rail
sector often argue that multi-industry agencies may lack sufficient industry-specific expertise or
focus on the particular technology. A second fear relates to the worst consequences associated to
the  failure  (by  corruption  or  incompetence)  of  a  single  regulatory  entity,  and  it  is  finally
suggested that multiproduct-industry  agencies are only  appropriated for small economies with
limited regulatory skills.
In any case, the choice of one form of regulation or another must be accompanied by a
well-defined list of competencies, since when the frontiers of the regulatory activity of an agency
are not fully specified, it is foreseeable that disputes will arise. Whatever the scope adopted for
the agency, the rules of the regulation game must be clear from the beginning not only for the
regulatory institution, but also for the regulated firms, whose owners and investors demand a safe
financial environment to carry out their investments.  In Britain, for example, the Office of the
Rail Regulator openly publicizes its aims and objectives, so that all the agents in the industry
know their jurisdiction and its limitations.
7.1.4. - The number of regulators and its appointment.
Many countries entrust their transport regulation decision-making authority to a commission or a
board of several members; others prefer a single individual. Smith (1996) evaluates each of these
alternatives according to the desired aims of the regulatory body. Individuals (such as the British
Rail  Regulator)  score  better  in  speed  of  decisionmaking,  accountability  and  predictability,
whereas comnmissions  (such as certain Transport Commissions in South America) are preferable
with regard to invulnerability to external influences, potential to reflect broader perspectives, and
potential to stagger terms to enhance stability.
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this is a question closely related  to their autonomy  or discretion.  To preserve it, rail regulators
should  have autonomy  in staffing  and budgeting, so that they could recruit staff with high levels
of expertise. Since overstaffing can lead to interference with the  commercial operation of
regulated  firms, the tasks of the agency should determine  the size of the staff, and not political
considerations  such as how many people have lost their  jobs through  as a result of privatization.
Some appointment  criteria, such as particular interests  in the industry  or inadequate  training, are
particularly critical for new regulatory agencies that have yet to  establish a reputation for
competence  and reliability.
7.2. - Regulatory  institutions  in practice:  Argentina  and the United  Kingdom.
All the features so far described allow us conclude that, with few particular details, the rail
industry does not require a particular treatment in the design of regulatory institutions. Some
controversial  issues, however, can be better understood  by comparing  case studies to illustrate
two different  approaches  to institutional  rail regulation:  United  Kingdom  and Argentina.
The privatization, unbundling and later, the franchising of former British Rail in the
United Kingdom,  constitutes  a paradigm  widely mentioned  in other parts of this paper (Bradsaw,
1996).  In fact, the rail industry  was the last of the big public utilities to be privatized in Britain.
The legal and regulatory  framework  for this privatization  was set up with an Act of Parliament  in
1993. Several significant structural  reforms were implemented  prior to privatization,  including
the horizontal and vertical break-up of the industry. The antecedents  in Europe (in Sweden,
where the State retained the control of the network) and in South America (where Chile first
introduced a total separation of railtracks and train operations) were surpassed in the United
Kingdom,  where the process aimed at the complete  private provision and management  of rail
services  and infrastructures  through  corresponding  franchises.
Box 7.1 describes  the institutional  regulation  both of services and of infrastructures  that
followed the franchising.  At the top level, two independent  regulatory  bodies were launched.
First, the Office of the Rail Regulator  (ORR),  in charge  of regulating  access to the national  track
via price-cap regulation on access charges and of monitoring the overall functioning of the
industry. Second,  the Office for Passenger  Rail Franchises  (OPRAF),  with the duty to administer,
supervise  and regulate  the franchising  of passenger services.  30 The franchisees,  selected  through  a
bidding process, owned Train Operator Companies  that were based on former British Rail train
operating  units and provided passenger  services.  There are also freight companies,  although  their
importance  is lower, and certain  unregulated  passenger  operators.  At a similar  level to the service
providers is Railtrack,  the private provider of infrastructure,  which charges  access fees for tracks
and lease stations.
30  There  are also other regulatory bodies not represented in Box 7.1, such  as the  Secretary of State :for Transport
(with a supervisory role) and the safety regulator, Health & Safety Executive, as mentioned in Section 4.
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At the bottom level of the British rail structure are the final users, the passengers  and
firms  demanding  transport  services, and  the  auxiliary companies.  For  example, the  existing
rolling stock leasing companies provide support to the TOCs, by leasing them locomotives and
wagons. They own nearly all passenger  rolling  stock,  and most  freight  locomotives. Finally,
although not represented in the figure, is the sector of infrastructure engineering, infrastructure
maintenance units and track renewal units, whose main partner in the system is Railtrack, and
which is competitively provided by private companies.
Box 7.2. Institutional structure of Argentina rail system.
|  Final  Users
The case of Argentina rail restructuring and its later institutional regulation is somehow
different, as summarized in Box 7.2. It is characterized by a lower level of complexity and a
lesser extent of both private participation and vertical unbundling. It is also interesting because it
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social,  can be  successfully provided  by the  private  sector, thus  showing that  separation  and
concessioning can work and yield benefits (Estache, 1997).
The restructuring  process  initiated  with  the  former public  rail  operator, Ferrocarriles
Argentinos (FA), began when it was split into several separate freight and commuter integrated
networks that  were  later  concessioned.  The  infrastructure,  however,  was  not  privatized  and
coordination, particularly  in the Buenos  Aires  Metropolitan  Area, was enforced  by  a unique
multi-modal  transport  authority.  Thus,  the  State  remains  the  owner  of  the  fixed  facilities,
including tracks and stations, and of the rolling stock. The concessionaires have to pay a fee for
the use of the fixed infrastructure and a rent for the use of the rolling stock received from the
former FA.
The new regulation of the rail sector in Argentina is headed by a public department, the
Comisi6n  Nacional  de  Regulaci6n  del  Transporte  (National  Commission  for  Transport
Regulation, or CNRT), dependent on the Ministry of Economy and with jurisdiction  over both
rail and road freight and passenger transport. This commission is in charge of monitoring the
overall  performance  of  the  transport  sector,  including  the  safety  and  quality  standards.  Its
competencies also include the design and implementation of the concession contracts.
The comparison  between  Argentina  and  United  Kingdom  rail  restructuring  processes
sheds some lights on the issue of designing regulatory institutions for the rail industry that can
serve as a conclusion for this section. The British case is an example of a fully privatized system
including both infrastructures and services, with regulatory institutions at different overlapping
levels. The Office of the Rail Regulator controls the overall system, but some of the regulatory
functions are in  hands of the  OPRAF (with respect  to passenger  traffic)  and  Railtrack  (with
regard to infrastructure).
In summary, the design of regulatory institutions for any industry, and the rail sector is not
an exception, is a complex task that involves the balance of many different forces among which
the more important ones are the regulator's  objectives and resources, the institutional structure of
the  country,  and  the  concrete  industry  conditions  faced  in  each  case.  Different  regulatory
objectives have differing direct effects on the type of regulatory controls used in the rail industry.
For example, the ultimate reason behind several rail concessioning processes in South America
was the proven underperformance of the existing national railways, whereas the privatization of
British Rail in United Kingdom also aimed at political objectives.
Similarly,  limited  resources  also  affect  the  nature  of  regulatory  activities.  Detailed
information  about  current  operating  technologies,  potential  alternative  technologies,  and
consumer preferences is the key  to  designing  effective regulation policy  in the rail  industry.
Substantial information about the performance of the regulated railroad is also required in many
settings to implement and enforce regulatory policy, in the sense described in previous section. If
regulators have excellent resources (e.g. a large, well-trained and experienced staff to perform
research), they are often better able to understand the environment in which they operate and
make better policies.
As  a  second  influencing  element,  the  institutional  structure  of  the  country  in  which
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ability to deliver promised rewards or threatened penalties and the set of complementary control
instruments used in this  environment. 'Thus, regulatory policy is only effective inasmuch as it
influences the activities of the regulated firm. To do so, regulatory policy must create systematic,
credible and  durable  links  between  the  firm's  activities  and  its  financial  well  being.  The
regulator's commitment ability facilitates the birth of these links and is determined by a variety of
factors (such  as the political  pressure  and  the  independence the regulator  may gain from  it,
particularly from a financial point of view), and the form of appointment of the regulator (number
of appointees, disqualifying of candidates, length of term mandates, etc.).
Finally,  as  the  third  element  of  the  design  of  the  regulatory  activity,  it  should  be
considered that the proper scope, form and function of regulation should depend on the concrete
industry  conditions  faced  in  each  case.  The  type  of  productive  technology,  the  consumers'
willingness expressed through their demand, or the information conditions in the markets is likely
to affect the interaction of the regulator and the regulated firms. For example, in the rail industry,
when  the  production  technology  exhibits  increasing  returns  to  scale,  regulation  should  be
concerned on how to minimize potential market power threats. If no other suppliers exist, and
benchmarking  is  no  longer  possible,  the  regulator  may  be  forced  to  investigate  the  firm's
operations in lengthy detail before it can fashion reasonable regulatory rulings.
8.  - CONCLUSIONS.
The economic theory of transport regulation has undergone an explosion of interest over the last
decade. Traditionally, it was viewed as a pure exercise of second best optimization, and largely
based  upon  the  acknowledgment  of  the  existence  of  huge  informational  problems.
Simultaneously, the worldwide rail industry has experienced a deep restructuring process aimed
at stopping  the erosion  of the sector's  share  in transportation  markets.  The process  adopted
diverse forms according to  each country's  objectives and  circumstances, varying from simple
reorganization measures to  extreme restructurings,  in which  private  participation and  vertical
separation of infrastructures from service provision, have been the most defining features.
Consequently, this  paper suggests that the regulation  of the rail  industry today cannot
remain unaffected by these changes. A number of new regulatory scenarios have emerged and
further  regulatory  issues  have  appeared,  such  as  the  definition  of  contracts  for  private
participation, the adaptation of traditional price controls to the new environment, the definition of
quality surveillance instruments, and the design of mechanisms to manage and plan infrastructure
investments in this context.
Some new problems and difficulties have also arisen after the restructuring process. For
example, in cases where  licenses have been used,  several concessionaires have been unable to
fulfill the objectives agreed in the concession contract. This is a reason for making the contracts
flexible enough to take account of novel situations that may affect the companies' performance.
On  the  other  hand,  the  credibility  of  the  system  cannot  allow  unjustified  and  systematic
deviations from the objectives laid out in the franchise.
Therefore,  in  all  cases,  total  support  of  the  government  for  the  privatization  or
deregulating process has been a key factor in order to provide the necessary changes in the law. It
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commercial approach  necessary to  its success. This  is particularly  the case in  less developed
countries and emerging economies, where the privatization of the rail sector seems to have had
positive effects on the modernization and development of the industry.
In any event, proper measures from a regulatory point of view must be taken to safeguard
interests other than strictly private ones. Thus, the development of the railway industry should
constitute a mechanism favoring development and regional equilibrium, as well as maintaining
certain public service obligations.
Finally, although the usual belief  is that private rail companies  are more efficient than
public ones, some experiences show that important increases can be achieved in efficiency levels
without needing to fully privatize the industry. In addition, there remain some critical views with
regard to the final viability of the restructuring experiences in some countries. In particular, it has
been mentioned that the new system for the railways is accompanied by a complex institutional
requirement that often entails more relationships and higher transaction costs among the agents
within the industry.
On the other hand,  the vertical  separation  of  infrastructure and  services, undoubtedly
presents  advantages, but  there are also disadvantages  such as the loss of economies of scope
deriving from a network integrated at strategic, tactical and operational levels. It should also be
pointed out that the franchising processes do not always ensure a competitive result.
In  conclusion,  although  there  is  no  unique  form  of  rail  regulation  to  face  the  new
challenges, the general behavioral rule and main advice from this paper is to maintain flexibility
and simplicity whenever possible. These criteria suggest that the design of license contracts that
include private participation, and the organization of the industry adapted to each country's  needs
and characteristics, should be viewed as two of the key issues in the new regulatory environment
of the  rail  industry.  In turn,  the  use  of these  mechanisms  also  changes the role  of  the  rail
regulator, whose actions should be, from now on, governed by principles that foster competition
and market mechanisms whenever possible, while simultaneously providing a stable legal  and
institutional framework for economic activity. The regulator should refrain from interventions
unless the ultimate goal of achieving economic efficiency subject to the socially demanded level
of equity is in jeopardy.  This paper was intended to offer some hints on how to carry out this
goal.
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